Tensions are flaring between Turkey and Greece over the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands and a host of other issues.

Considering Russia’s military expansion across the region, it would be strategically wise for the two NATO members to de-escalate and improve relations based on mutual trust and respect.

In a recent speech, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to invade Greek territories in retaliation for alleged hostile action against Turkish jets by Greece.

This isn’t the first time the Greek army harassed Turkish jets and ships, nor the first time Erdogan has made inflammatory remarks.

Stirring up nationalism?

Both Greece’s Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Erdogan are facing tough upcoming general elections. Rallying national sentiments could help them secure a win.

Athens by night. Pixabay.

But the sources of these mounting tensions go beyond electoral calculations. Turkey and Greece have unresolved historical issues as well as a set of post-Second World War disputes that still fester. These include the status of Cyprus, access to hydrocarbon resources in the east Mediterranean Sea, the aerial and maritime boundaries of the Aegean islands and the militarization of these islands.

Assertive policies by both Ankara and Athens in the last decade have exacerbated the two countries’ already tumultuous relationship.

During the early phase of the Arab uprisings, Turkey backed the Muslim Brotherhood to expand its regional sphere of influence. The strategy did not pan out, however. Former Egyptian president Muhammed Morsi, a former Brotherhood leader, was deposed in a coup by the secular President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

The strategy damaged Turkey’s relations with leading Arab states for what they perceived to be interference in their internal affairs.

Turkey also prematurely involved itself in a great power competition by playing Russia against the United States, rather than aligning with the U.S. as it traditionally did.

Participating in both the Russia-sponsored Astana talks and the U.S.-backed Geneva process on the Syrian civil war was a reflection of an emerging independent Turkish foreign policy. This balancing act worked in Turkey’s favour at the height of the war, allowing it to become a deal-maker on a number of regional issues.

Turkish miscalculations

But the misreading of these short-term volatile dynamics as long-term strategic opportunities by Turkish policy-makers adversely affected its relations with both the Americans and the Europeans.

Policy decisions such as the government’s use of the refugee crisis as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Europe and the acquisition of the S-400 Russian air-defense system after the U.S. pulled its Patriot batteries from Turkey were the result of these misreadings.

The discord between Turkey and the U.S. led Washington to seek other regional partners. That’s when Greek and American interests converged. Greece needed foreign investment to revive its economy, and the U.S. needed stable territories to position its military to watch over the Middle East, North Africa, Russia and the Balkans.

During a visit to the White House in 2017, Alexis Tspiras, the then Greek prime minister, and Donald Trump made a US$2.4 billion deal to upgrade Greece’s F-16 fighters and increase American investment in the country. This deal indicated shifting U.S. strategies in the region.

The pace of these military relations accelerated once the centre-right Mitsotakis won the 2019 elections. An upgraded Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed two years later, allowing the U.S. military to operate and train on four military bases, including one in Alexandroupoli.

The agreement was condemned by the Greek left. The opposition party SYRIZA voted against its ratification and accused Mitsotakis of reducing Greece to “a U.S. satellite.”

Turkey hemmed in

Currently, Turkey is surrounded by Russia from the south and north, and by Greece — and by extension, the U.S. — from the west. It is left with little room to manoeuvre. Its ambitions to become a regional powerhouse are stunted for the foreseeable future.

In view of this geopolitical reality, Turkey understandably shares close relations with Russia. To balance and reduce its dependence on Moscow — particularly Russian natural gas and issues concerning Syria and the Black Sea — it needs to restore and improve its relations with the Arab world, the EU, the U.S. and Greece.

Istiqlal Street, Istanbul, Turkey, via Pixabay.

Greece, meanwhile, is emboldened. With an American military presence, it is upending Turkey strategically, particularly after the recent U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus. The lift lessens the burden on Greece as the military guarantor of Cyprus, and strengthens its position against Turkey in the east Mediterranean Sea, where the Turks have been conducting oil and gas exploration despite strong Greek opposition.

But there are repercussions to these developments. Greek territorial waters are now a target of global and regional anti-American forces.

Looking ahead

Tensions between Greece and Turkey are not new, but the future cannot be built on the grievances of the past. For greater regional stability, disputes cannot be left unresolved indefinitely.

The militarization of the Aegean islands and limiting the eastern Mediterranean Sea to an already surrounded Turkey will surely worsen relations. Turkey’s assertive policies in the last decade caused many unanticipated quandaries for the country, and similar policies may bear comparable consequences for Greece in the future.

With elections fast approaching, tensions and hyper-nationalistic rhetoric are heightened in both nations. With Turkey encircled and Greece growing assertive, it would be prudent for both to maintain close dialogue, focus on common interests and develop mutual trust in a region already engulfed by a series of ongoing conflicts.

Yasar Bukan, Lecturer in Global Politics & Political Philosophy, Toronto Metropolitan University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

( Middle East Monitor ) – For the first time in its long history, NATO’s unity is under threat as a result of the rift between two of its members; Turkiye and Greece and their manoeuvres in the Aegean Sea. The latest crisis between the two began in August when Turkiye accused its neighbour of locking onto Turkish fighter jets with its Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems deployed on the island of Crete. Ankara also claimed that Greek pilots placed Turkish aircraft under a radar lock over the Eastern Mediterranean during a NATO mission, while Greek planes harassed them during the exercise.

IC Bonus Video Link: Al Jazeera English: “What’s triggered the latest tension between Greece and Turkiye? | Inside Story” .

On Tuesday, Ankara summoned the Greek ambassador and protested to Washington after accusing Greece of deploying US armoured vehicles on two Aegean islands near the Turkish coast. Greece, however, said the move was “completely unfounded” and accused Ankara of aggressive behaviour.

In the wider international context, the rift between Turkiye and Greece takes place at a time when NATO is focused on displaying a united front against Russia in the face of its invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s war has directly affected NATO’s unity and priorities. By failing to address the tensions in the Aegean Sea, the differences between NATO members have revealed cracks that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be keen to exploit.

One of the main trigger points in the conflict between Turkiye and Greece is that both will head to the polls for crucial elections next year. Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan is said to be facing a major challenge to his 20-year rule amid the country’s economic woes and immigration problems. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, elected in 2019, reportedly suffered a popularity loss to some degree because of rising energy prices partly driven by the war in Ukraine. In both cases the leaders are playing to an internal audience in terms of patriotism.

Erdogan spoke earlier this week at Teknofest, Turkiye’s biggest aviation and aerospace festival, to say: “Look at history. If you cross the line any further, there will be a heavy price to pay. Don’t forget Izmir,” alluding to a defeat of occupying Greek forces in the western city in 1922.

In retaliation, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias appealed to NATO, its EU partners and the UN to formally condemn what he described as the “outrageous and increasingly aggressive talk by Turkish officials”.

As a mediator, the US is trying to find a balance between Greece and Turkiye. But, Turkiye’s agreement with Russia on the purchase of Moscow’s S-400 defense system changed the balance in 2017. It led to the US extending a bilateral military agreement with Greece for five years which was ratified by the Greek parliament in the summer. The US also cancelled a deal to supply Turkiye with F-35 fighter jets.

This came as Greek Defence Minister Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos visited the Pentagon to meet Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin in July, where the two discussed the growing defence partnership between Washington and Athens and the close cooperation based on defence modernisation, according to a statement from the Pentagon.

With regard to the F-35 deal, NATO’s and the US’ concern is not Turkiye. In the broader scheme of things their common enemy is Russia. Three years since Turkiye received the S-400 system, it has still not activated them in an effort to protect NATO’s defence system and unity. But, this is not enough to have sustainable peace in the Aegean dispute. In the evolving Ankara-Athens-Washington triangle, the US should find a balance in a just manner to protect NATO’s unity.

Elif Selin Calik is a journalist and independent researcher. She is a regular contributor to publications like TRT World, Daily Sabah, Rising Powers in Global Governance and Hurriyet Daily News. She was one of the the founders of the In-Depth News Department of Anadolu News Agency and participated in United Nations COP23 in Bonn as an observer. She holds an MA in Cultural Studies from the International University of Sarajevo and a second MA in Global Diplomacy from SOAS, University of London.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor or Informed Comment.

Via Middle East Monitor

This work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

The longstanding neutrality of Sweden and Finland was abandoned when both states submitted formal applications to Nato. But they are facing an unexpected obstacle on the way to membership: Turkey. While Turkey supports the alliance’s “open door” policy, Ankara’s veto reflects its aims to change the status quo and make gains in three areas: the eastern Mediterranean, Syria – and in its own domestic politics.

Turkey has always had bumpy relations with Nato. In 2009, Ankara blocked the appointment of the former Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as Nato secretary-general, because of his defence of free speech during the Danish cartoons crisis in 2006. He also allowed a rebel Kurdish TV station to broadcast from Denmark into Turkey. Another low point was in 2019, when Turkey started a military campaign against the Kurdish forces in Syria. This led to Nato secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, criticising Ankara for “jeopardising” the fight against Islamic State.

The current crisis is in some ways a hangover from previous episodes particularly in relation to the Kurdish region in Syria. But it is unfolding against the backdrop of different geopolitical realities, including the deterioration of relations between the west and Russia, as well as a new domestic political context in Turkey.

Turkey vs Greece

There is an interesting backstory to the recent confrontation between Greece and Turkey involving tensions between the US and Turkey – which have been building up for some time. When, in 2017, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin agreed on a deal for the purchase of Russian S-400 missile system, the US retaliated with the exclusion of Turkey from the F35 jet fighters development programme, banning Turkey from the purchase of the jets. The Biden administration has reportedly been considering dropping this ban in recent months, prompting the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, to urge the US Congress to reconsider.

There’s a complex background to all this. Athens is a key player in eastern Mediterranean energy politics, and the exploration of energy sources in the contested waters of the eastern Mediterranean as well as Egypt’s need to transport its natural gas exports to Europe has forged an alliance between Greece, Israel, Egypt and Cyprus – a bloc which excludes Turkey. Meanwhile, the EU has sanctioned two executives of Turkish Petroleum Incorporated Company for “illegal drilling activities”, because they were unauthorised by the Republic of Cyprus, which claims sovereignty in the area.

But as the search for alternative energy sources for Europe continues against the backdrop of the breakdown of relations with Russia over the war in Ukraine, Ankara sees an opportunity to break its isolation by becoming an energy hub for the west. However it believes Sweden and Finland’s prospective Nato membership could increase opposition to Turkey’s energy interests within the alliance in favour of Greece and Cyprus.

Turkey vs YPG

Meanwhile Sweden and Finland have operated an arms embargo against Turkey since 2019, prompted by Turkish military operations against Kurdish People’s Defence Forces (YPG) in northern Syria. Turkey sees the YPG as the offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is recognised as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US and the EU.

Sweden is home to a huge number of Kurdish refugees, estimated at more than 100,000 and Ankara has long been uneasy about the relationship between the Swedish leadership and the the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD – the political wing of YPG). These concerns deepened after Magdalena Andersson was elected as prime minister in 2021, partly as a result of the support of a Kurdish member of parliament. It has been reported that the support was secured in exchange for increasing cooperation between Andersson’s Social Democrats and the PYD, including better treatment of the supporters of YPG in Sweden and not giving in to Turkey’s demands.

Turkey also claims that Sweden provides military equipment to the Kurds, something it has criticised as against “the spirit of the alliance”.

Like in the eastern Mediterranean, the new geopolitical context offers Ankara an opportunity to change the status quo in favour of Turkey. If Ankara were to secure Swedish and Finnish concessions on reducing support to the Kurds in Syria, it would be seen as an important victory for Turkey. Assurances that Sweden and Finland would not block the military equipment transfer to Turkey or veto the trigger of Article 5 of the Nato treaty in case Turkey is attacked by an aggressor, would also be significant gains.

Domestic politics

Domestic politics is also playing an important part in Turkey’s diplomatic manoeuvrings. According to the latest polls, Erdoğan faces stiff opposition in the 2023 presidential elections and his Justice and Development Party could lose its parliamentary majority to a united opposition alliance, thanks to a deepening economic crisis, high inflation and devalued Turkish lira.

Erdoğan, like any populist politician, knows how to manipulate voters by presenting himself as a strong hand against perceived enemies at home or abroad. Presenting a tough stance against Sweden and Finland’s support for the Kurdish forces in Syria, plays well to domestic audiences in Turkey. As does hitting back against Greece. It all adds up to a “siege mentality” strategy, which is likely to be the backbone of the government’s election campaign in coming months. The government is likely to make strong associations between the opposition parties and internal and external threats to help shift the focus from the deep economic crisis besetting the country.

Turkey cannot postpone Swedish and Finnish membership forever – but it’s possible that Ankara will receive some of the assurances it seeks. After all, Erdoğan has got away with using international crises for its own domestic and foreign policy ends. But in the context of a new cold war between the west and Russia, Turkey’s manoeuvrings might play into the hands of those questioning Turkey’s commitment to the alliance.

Ali Bilgic, Reader in International Relations and Security, Loughborough University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

When a wave of right-wing extremism hit Greece in 2012, few would have predicted that Golden Dawn, one of the groups involved, would grow to become the third largest party in the Greek parliament. This was the beginning of a long period of turmoil in Greek politics that saw a violent street movement become a viable political force.

But this neo-fascist “fairy tale” ended in what was considered the biggest Nazi trial since Nuremberg. Golden Dawn has been declared a criminal organisation and its leaders jailed, because of their involvement in unlawful activities – including murders, attacks on migrants, illegal possession of weapons and racketeering.

The leadership was also found guilty of ordering the murder of leftist rapper Pavlos Fyssas.

Prior to that, another murder attempt on Egyptian fisherman Abuzid Embarak in 2012, showed that the party was deliberately trying to incite violence, something that has been previously described by a number academics and journalists as an attempt to target minorities.

The trial lasted more than five years due to numerous delays and setbacks that turned the whole process into a never-ending chaos. In the meantime, the party was free to stand candidates in general and local elections without restrictions.

In total, 37 members of Golden Dawn were convicted – including leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos and 17 MPs – who have now been convicted and sentenced by the Greek court. Ioannis Lagos, Golden Dawn’s only remaining member of the European parliament, is likely to have his parliamentary immunity revoked any day now. Lagos is best known for ripping up a Turkish flag during a debate.

Why Golden Dawn was different

Every European country has fringe groups like Golden Dawn. They are often part of larger right-wing extremist networks with small but loyal bases.

Golden Dawn went mainstream soon after announcing its first major election campaign. Timing was crucial. The growing political instability in the country meant three general elections were held between 2009 and 2012. All major parties were losing public approval over their handling of the fiscal crisis.

On top of that, the only active far-right party in parliament back then (the Popular Orthodox Rally) had agreed to participate in a provisional coalition government organised by Lucas Papademos to get the country out of crisis. This move was seen as a betrayal by supporters.

The Greek far-right scene seemed weak, allowing Golden Dawn to step in and fill that gap without facing competition. Its monopoly allowed it to act in the most politically aggressive way. It embraced national purity, anticommunism, and promised mass migrant deportations. This rhetoric and an obsession with the refugee crisis started to pay off very quickly.

Calls for more aggressive migration policies became central to its election campaigns. Recent academic findings showed that exposure to the refugee crisis in rural Greece increased support for Golden Dawn.

The party secured a shocking 9.4% of the vote in the European Parliament election of 2014, while in September 2015 it peaked nationally with 7%.

Who fills the void?

During the early years of the Greek economic crisis, it looked as though the public was trying to punish the political system through the ballot box. It is widely believed that this age of anger had passed by 2017, which was when Golden Dawn’s downfall began. Greece rejected populism and abandoned fringe politics, allowing mainstream parties to become popular once again.

In the general election of 2019, Golden Dawn lost all its parliamentary seats and had to shut down most of its branches to survive financially.

However, the party casts a long shadow and continues to shape Greek politics. The more mainstream New Democracy, for example, has opened its doors to a number of far-right politicians, who ran successful campaigns in the recent election. Some of them had previously expressed strong xenophobic and antisemitic views.

Kyriakos Velopoulos’ ultranationalist party Greek Solution, meanwhile, won ten seats in the Greek parliament after a long period of campaigning against migrants. Golden Dawn’s spokesperson Ilias Kasidiaris has formed a new movement called Greeks for the Fatherland – even though he, too, is now in jail.

Kasidiaris has attempted to distance himself from neo-Nazi ideology in the wake of the Golden Dawn trial but his commitment to that change is yet to be tested. The same voters who embraced violence and legitimised Golden Dawn for its violent practices could support a similar movement. We might expect any such party to be less aggressive and neo-Nazi than Golden Dawn, but its values will be similar.

Greece has shown us how to deal with neo-Nazis. But when it comes to extremism, it is important to recognise the years of antifascist activism during Golden Dawn’s rise. It was a fight that, at times, seemed like a lost cause.

Democracy managed to pass an important test in the prosecution and sentencing of this criminal organisation. The court ruling was enough to eradicate Golden Dawn, but fascist remnants are still out there, reorganising and planning their next move.

Georgios Samaras, PhD Research Associate, Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

Al Jazeera English: “Greece: Golden Dawn found guilty of running criminal organization”

( Clean Energy Wire) – Volkswagen (VW) and the Greek government are planning a pilot project to introduce fully electric mobility on an island in the southeastern Aegean Sea, business daily Handelsblatt reports. In the next two years, all cars, trucks, motorcycles and buses on the island of Astypalea are to be replaced by electric vehicles running on solar and wind energy and will be provided by the Wolfsburg-based company.

VW CEO Herbert Diess and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis signed a declaration of intent for the project, with Diess calling the project a “future-facing blueprint for clean mobility and a clean environment.” The project was launched at the initiative of Greece, Deputy Foreign Minister Kostas Fragogiannis said and enlisted VW as a partner in Setpember.

“Astypalea offers ideal conditions for this project,” said Fragogiannis. “Here we can plan an electromobility system from scratch. Astypalea is just the right size to test these new transport systems, and the residents were immediately convinced by the idea.”

The island is home to some 1,300 inhabitants, most of whom use their own means of transportation, a the public transport network consists of a single, ten-kilometer bus line, served by two vehicles. These will be replaced by electric shuttle buses.

In addition, three car-sharing stations with 50 vehicles and four sharing stations with 67 electric bicycles and 100 electric motorcycles are planned. The switch to e-vehicles will be voluntary in principle. However, the state is providing massive subsidies and tax benefits to support it and VW has pledged to provide “extensive support” to the island’s inhabitants and businesses.

Via
Clean Energy Wire.

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

Presentation of the project “Smart & Sustainable Island” for Astypalaia

A nationalist Turkish politician, Devlet Bahceli, is quoted as having said of said this past weekend, “War with Greece is only a matter of time.”

Meanwhile, Bianet reports that the spokesman for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Ömer Çelik, said Tuesday that “Turkey will not accept or forgive any action or bluff against its maritime blue homeland. Greece is now a rogue state in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and is reaching past its grasp.”

Celik and Bahceli are upset by several recent Greek actions, including the government decision to claim territory up to 12 nautical miles off its coast. A lot of Greece is small islands in the Mediterranean, and some of them are very close to Turkey, so this claim, which is permitted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, would take it right to Turkey’s doorstep. The United States also claims 12 nautical miles off its coast. Some countries, such as Iran, claim substantially more.

The Greek claim of extended territorial waters would in some instances overlap with waters claimed by Turkey, and interfere with Turkey’s search for natural gas deposits off its coast. Turkey claims to have found a middling gas field in the Black Sea, which would provide its needs for seven years once developed.

Frankly, Turkey’s and other Mediterranean countries’ mania for new natural gas finds is brain dead. It would be much cheaper to just put in wind farms and solar panels, and then they wouldn’t be burning fossil fuels that will erode their coast lines and cause sea rise and megastorms.

President Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP has dominated parliament for nearly two decades not on its own, but with the support of the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish acronym MHP). Although it hasn’t always been a formal ally of the center-right, pro-Islam AKP, it has voted with it on key issues, and the two ran as a coalition in 2018.

Bahceli heads the Nationalist Movement Party. He does not run Turkey, but he is a mover and shaker and allied with the man who does run Turkey.

The issue of Greece’s territorial sea is only one irritant. The island of Cyprus is partitioned into a Greek-speaking Republic of Cyprus close to Athens and a Turkish republic recognized only by Ankara. The ownership of gas deposits off the coast of Cyprus have caused conflict between Turkey and Greece. Turkey has insisted on doing exploratory drilling, and there was even a collision between a Turkish and a Greek vessel.

Turkey’s strategic agreement with the UN-recognized government of Libya in Tripoli implies the drawing of a line through the Mediterranean delineating a Turkish naval sphere of influence, which is opposed by Western European countries. This issue is also wrought up with the Cyprus gas dispute.

Since Trump doesn’t like NATO and seems to wish it would drop dead, the US is not playing a mediating role between its two allies. Germany is just siding with Greece, which Bahceli calls a European “crusade.”

Just as the US government is asleep at the switch on the coronavirus pandemic, it is asleep in the face of these rising eastern Mediterranean tensions, which could spiral out of control.

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Bonus Video:

France 24: “Tensions escalate between Greece and Turkey in eastern Mediterranean”

The worsening stand-off in the eastern Mediterranean, frequently described as a gas conflict, has been gaining momentum. Yet it is a strange time to be fighting over gas when prices remain in a slump due to weak demand and investors withdrawing. So what explains the escalating conflict between Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, which is drawing in other regional and European powers?

Large reserves of oil and gas were discovered in the region a decade ago. The estimates are worth trillions of dollars to the surrounding countries even at today’s prices.

On August 13 Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned there would be a heavy price for anyone attacking the Turkish drilling vessel Oruç Reis, which is exploring for oil and gas in waters claimed by both Turkey and Greece. This came after a collision between Greek and Turkish navy frigates left international actors on high alert.

France immediately pledged military support to Greece, while Angela Merkel reportedly called the Greek and Turkish leaders to help de-escalate tensions. The old Aegean rivals are now almost as close to open conflict as during Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus invasion.

The eastern Mediterranean

Until recently, the Turkish-Greek conflict over oil and gas was very much associated with the Cyprus problem: Turkey was drilling off the coast of Turkish Cyprus, a state not recognised by the rest of the international community. But the current stand-off has dramatically shifted the conflict into open sea.

Turkey claims exploitation rights within an area it claims as continental shelf. Greece’s counter claim is that all its inhabited islands are surrounded by a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), per the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which Turkey is not a party. A blind application of these rules “locks” Turkey’s exploitation rights into a small corner around the Gulf of Antalya.

Both claims are formalised in bilateral agreements with other countries in the region. Turkey signed an EEZ agreement in late 2019 with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and, more recently, Greece with Egypt.

The Turkish-Libyan agreement implies that not even the largest Greek island, Crete, has a continental shelf – let alone the much smaller Kastelorizo off the Turkish (Lycian) coast. This position is legally tricky, but Turkey’s claim for some share of the offshore cake seemed in particular to be understood by Germany. EU leaders haven’t been able to agree to impose new sanctions on Turkey to add to the ones they previously imposed in response to the drilling off Cyprus – at least for the time being. Erdoğan has allegedly promised Merkel that Turkey will soften its position in the days ahead.

Gas bonanza?

With gas prices so low, it calls into question whether it would be profitable to extract these resources right now – let alone the plan between Israel, Greece and Cyprus to build an EastMed pipeline to sell the gas to the EU (which excludes Turkey and any notion of Turkish Cyprus).

Gas price, US$/therm

Yet the collapse of gas prices is outweighed by the implosion of the Turkish lira. Turkey is hungry for hydrocarbon-based growth and urgently needs more foreign exchange to prop up its currency, having lately been relying on dollars from Qatar. In this context, seeking energy wealth seems intuitive.

Except that it is not. Gas exploration and production, especially on a seabed, requires hefty upfront investment – never mind the geopolitical cost. Unsurprisingly, Israel now prefers solar energy to gas-fired power stations, while (legal) drilling has stopped off Cyprus altogether.

Undeterred, Turkey claims its position is more defensive than expansionist, but some commentators point to its “mavi vatan” (“blue homeland”) strategy in the eastern Mediterranean. At best, this is about naval hegemony. At worst, it implies revising borders agreed in the 1923 Lausanne treaty.

Turkey’s continuing commitment to Turkish Cyprus, alongside introducing the lira to the parts of northern Syria it controls, are seen as clear evidence. Yet with Turkey frozen out by the EastMed pipeline and most EEZ agreements in the region, Erdoğan’s assertiveness may be less about seizing territory or energy than pushing for a seat at the negotiating table.

Regional alignments

Nonetheless, Turkish assertiveness has naturally galvanised potential adversaries – including Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, France and also Iraq, where Turkish forces are conducting a large operation against the Kurdish-separatist PKK. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that has come out as spearhead of this alliance.

The Gulf monarchies and Egypt are threatened by Turkey and Qatar’s pro-Muslim Brotherhood position, plus their military cooperation agreements – most recently including a naval facility in the Libyan rebel stronghold of Misrata. The UAE is intervening in Libya too, openly claiming responsibility for a recent airbase attack in western Libya where Turkish drones operate in support of the GNA. Together with the Turkey-Libya EEZ agreement, it shows how tightly the gas conflict is linked to Libya’s civil war.

The UAE’s peace deal with Israel can be seen in light of this Turkish expansionism – about which Jerusalem has been conspicuously quiet. But if Israel is tacitly supporting the alliance, more assertive is another Mediterranean power, headed by a president who declared NATO “brain dead” in 2019 partly in reference to Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria.

Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beirut was by no means as accidental as the explosion that devastated the Lebanese capital. He and the UAE pledged to co-fund harbour repairs, pre-empting Turkey’s own bid. France now has military agreements with the UAE, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, all geared towards curbing the actions of a fellow NATO member and EU candidate.

And while Berlin is left trying to reach a balance in the Greece-Turkey confrontation, Washington, traditionally the guarantor of peace between the Aegean NATO rivals, has been almost totally silent. There is a sense that all parties want to take advantage of this, onshore and offshore, before the US elections. It is oddly this vacuum, rather than fossil fuels, that is fanning regional rivalries. With the US withdrawn, Moscow continuing its opaque brinkmanship and the EU split over Turkey, the scene is unfortunately set for more instability to come.

Clemens Hoffmann, Lecturer in International Politics, University of Stirling

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

Al Jazeera English: “Greece-Turkey tension”

People with different orientations are responding to this announcement differently. Some are reacting against modern Turkey’s founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s 1935 decision to convert the facility to a museum. Many from this same group of people seem to be concerned about the honor and respect for Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror, who took Constantinople in 1453, who is reported to have been praised in the hadith that predicted the liberation of Constantinople. Another group appears to be motivated by Turkey’s glorious past and for them the Sultan had made significant contribution to build Turkey’s global image and any action that undermines Sultan Mehmet’s legacy would harm this image. Meanwhile the Turkish apex court has come forward with a judgement that the 1935 decision to change the status from a place of worship to a museum as illegal and therefore returning the facility to worshipers would be the only right action to take.

Our question here, however, is whether the Sultan made a mistake by converting the functioning church to a mosque and whether we must – the later generations – approve all actions of our heroes irrespective of their validity and consequences. In my humble opinion, it was a mistake on the part of the Sultan to convert the venue to a mosque. In this context, one must keep in mind that committing mistakes is human and our father Prophet Adam (on whom be peace) committed a mistake in the beginning of human history. In the current milieu, one should remember an event during the liberation of Makkah under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Following the liberation ‘Abbas, the prophet’s uncle, demanded the key of the Ka‘ba from the clan Bani ‘Abd ad-Dar who were not yet Muslim. The Prophet granted the request. Immediately the Prophet received the verse “Allah commands you to deliver trusts to those worthy of them; and when you judge between people, judge with justice. Excellent is the admonition Allah gives you. Allah is All-Hearing, All-Seeing (4: 58).” The Prophet understood the implication and instantaneously returned the key back to ‘Uthman ibn Abi Talha and his cousin Shaybah ibn ‘Uthman, the two representative figures of Bani ‘Abd ad-Dar. The rationale behind this act seems to have been that the clan was traditionally maintaining the trust of the people with the key and had been providing the necessary services to pilgrims, and therefore there was no need to deprive them of the charge. The Prophet received guidance from the Creator because he was in direct touch with Him, but for followers the mechanism is, as has been suggested in the Qur’an, is to counsel one another (103: 3). Therefore, the followers of the Qur’an must analyze ideas and events to counsel and correct one another’s mistake even though centuries might have passed.

One should also look at the prophetic teachings about treatment of non-Muslims. The Prophet in his covenant with the Christians of Najran pledged: “I commit myself to support them, to place their persons under my protection, as well as their churches, chapels, oratories, the monasteries of their monks, the residences of their anchorites, wherever they are found, … Nor is it permitted to destroy any part of their churches, to take parts of their buildings to construct mosques or the homes of Muslims.” He extended similar covenant to other Christian communities living in other areas of Arabia. Following the prophetic tradition the second caliph ‘Umar (may God be pleased with him) extended similar pledge to non-Muslim communities in Jerusalem when it came under Muslim rule.

Ideally, Sultan Mehmet II should have extended similar treaty to the Orthodox Church when he liberated Constantinople in 1453, but circumstances at the time were different. Indeed the Sultan seems to have taken the action in accordance to demands of his time. Muslim places of worship at the time were being confiscated and converted to churches and other miscellaneous treatments in the Iberian Peninsula. In addition, one should note that at this time there was no Muslim places of worship in Istanbul. The Fatih Sultan Mehmed Mosque which is located about four kilometer away from Hagia Sophia, came about decade and a half later, the Suleymaniye mosque, which is over three kilometer away, came more than a century later. The Sultan Ahmet Mosque next door to Hagia Sophia was founded in 1617, more than century and a half later. Therefore, there was a genuine need for Muslim place of worship in the city. However, circumstances have changed in the 21^st century, no mosque is being converted to church in Spain these days, and the need for prayer space for Muslims in Istanbul does not apply any more. In fact, churches in many western countries have now opened their doors to Muslims for worship. Therefore, it is only proper for the Turkish government to reconsider the whole situation in the light of changed circumstances.

Questions are being raised about the legal implications of wars of conquest – what happens when wars end – how should victorious parties treat defeated parties? What happens to properties of the subjugated? Should one treat places of worship differently from other properties? Some apologetics have come forward with a document suggesting that the Sultan purchased the property where Hagia Sophia is located from priests who were responsible for it. Argument has also been put forward that the venue was vandalized by Catholics in one of the Crusades and was not being used for religious purposes when the Sultan liberated the city, and therefore the Sultan was absolutely justified to restore the facility to a place of worship. However, in our view, Hagia Sophia should not be compared with any normal place of worship. In fact, the abode is reported to have been a place of worship for centuries before the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I had built what he called Hagia Sophia or the House of Divine Wisdom. One should ignore occasional lawlessness in such places. Could we not maintain the same status for which it was built? If the Prophet of God could afford to trust a non-Muslim clan to administer the key to the Ka’ba, who are we to deny key to the house of Divine Wisdom to its original holder? However, handing over Hagia Sophia to the Orthodox Church could happen only in an ideal world and we hardly live in an ideal realm.

In a world mired by the clash of civilizations thesis, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) seems to be a good platform to initiate any such discussion. In order to reduce world tension the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero called for an alliance of civilizations at the United Nations General Assembly in 2004 and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan came forward to co-sponsor it. Although the institution began its journey for conflict resolution in 2005 with the blessings of the UN Secretary General with a lot of enthusiasm, with the passage of time it seems to have lost excitement. In an atmosphere of nation-state sovereignty, it is always difficult for international organizations such as UNAOC to make an impact in international politics. This is particularly true for nations such as Spain and Turkey, which do not have veto power in the United Nation Security Council. Yet for Spain and Turkey to come forward in order to address a crisis created in the name of clash of civilizations. Keeping in view Spain’s past record, it was a great gesture on the part of the Spanish government to come forward not only with the proposal of an alliance of civilizations, Spain also withdrew its troops from Iraq at a time when many Muslims had become victim of the so-called War on Terror. Perhaps that is why Turkey came forward to co-sponsor the Spanish proposal. However, circumstances have changed over the past decade or so. Mr. Zapatero is no more in power and Spain does not seem to be following the alliance of civilizations agenda actively any more.

If the Turkish people were to be convinced in returning Hagia Sophia to Christians, they would like to see the return of mosques that were converted to churches and other facilities in the 14^th and 15^th centuries in Spain back to Muslim hands. In other words, both Spain and the Catholic Church will have to revise their history and correct their mistakes. Pope Francis has expressed his “pain” and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew has expressed that he has been “saddened and shaken” at Turkey’s decision on Hagia Sophia but, in our opinion, both must do more to earn respect and trust of Muslims. The UNESCO too must do more to help Muslims regain their civilizational heritage in Spain. As for the government in Turkey, it too does not seem to enjoy the same higher moral ground that it had enjoyed in 2005 to impress the Spanish government. Mr. Erdogan’s AK Party has slowly centralized power through a new presidential system. In addition, the cordial relationship Turkey had developed with neighboring countries, particularly with Greece and Armenia during first decade in power, does not seem to be continuing any more. These are not good signs for gaining trust either nationally or internationally.

In our view, Hagia Sophia issue has the potential to not only revive the moribund institution and rekindle its mission and vision; it has the potential to generate trust among all world civilizations. It is always difficult to relate ideals with realities. The Hagia Sophia issue principally demands spiritual consideration. Both political and religious leaders should put their hands on their heart and think what Mawlana Rumi would have done in this situation. My faith tells me that not only Rumi, Sultan Mehmed II too would now have been pleased if a decision on the matter were made based on Divine Wisdom.

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

CBC News: “Turkey’s Hagia Sophia turned back into a mosque, causing a divide”

In the fifth century B.C., the playwright Sophocles begins “Oedipus Tyrannos” with the title character struggling to identify the cause of a plague striking his city, Thebes. (Spoiler alert: It’s his own bad leadership.)

As someone who writes about early Greek poetry, I spend a lot of time thinking about why its performance was so crucial to ancient life. One answer is that epic and tragedy helped ancient storytellers and audiences try to make sense of human suffering.

From this perspective, plagues functioned as a setup for an even more crucial theme in ancient myth: a leader’s intelligence. At the beginning of the “Iliad,” for instance, the prophet Calchas – who knows the cause of a nine-day plague – is praised as someone “who knows what is, what will be and what happened before.”

This language anticipates a chief criticism of Homer’s legendary King Agamemnon: He does not know “the before and the after.”

The epics remind their audiences that leaders need to be able to plan for the future based on what has happened in the past. They need to understand cause and effect. What caused the plague? Could it have been prevented?

People’s recklessness

Myths help their audiences understand the causes of things. As narrative theorists like Mark Turner and specialists in memory like Charles Fernyhough emphasize, people learn how to behave from stories and concepts of cause and effect in childhood. The linear sequence of before, now and after communicates the relationships between things and how we, as human beings, understand our own responsibility in the world.

Plague stories provide settings where fate pushes human organization to the limit. Human leaders are almost always crucial to the causal sequence, as Zeus observes in Homer’s “Odyssey,” saying, as I’ve translated it, “Humans are always blaming the gods for their suffering / but they experience pain beyond their fate because of their own recklessness.”

The problems humans create go beyond just plagues: The poet Hesiod writes that the top Greek god, Zeus, showed his disapproval for bad leaders by burdening them with military failures as well as pandemics. The consequences of human failings are a refrain in the ancient critique of leaders, with or without plagues: The “Iliad,” for instance, describes rulers who “ruin their people through recklessness.” The “Odyssey” phrases it as “bad shepherds ruin their flocks.”

Devastating illness

Plagues were common in the ancient world, but not all of them were blamed on leaders. Like other natural disasters, they were frequently blamed on the gods.

But historians, like Polybius in the second century B.C. and Livy in the first century B.C., also frequently recount epidemics striking armies and people in swamps or cities with poor sanitation. Philosophers and physicians also searched for rational approaches – blaming the climate, or pollution.

When the historian Thucydides recounts how a plague with alleged origins in Ethiopia hit Athens in 430 B.C., he vividly describes patients suffering a sudden high fever, shortness of breath and an array of sickly discharges. Those who survived the sickness had endured such delirious fevers that they might have no memory of it all.

Athens as a state was unprepared to meet the challenge of that plague. Thucydides describes the futility of any human response: Appeals to the gods and the work of doctors – who died in droves – were equally useless. The disease wreaked havoc because the Athenians were massed within the city walls to wait out the Spartan armies during the Peloponnesian War.

Yet despite the plague’s terrible nature, Thucydides insists that the worst part was the despair people felt from fear and the “horror of human beings dying like sheep.”

Sick people died of neglect, of the lack of proper shelter and of disease spreading from improper burials in an unprepared and overcrowded city, followed by looting and lawlessness.

Athens, set up as a fortress against its enemies, brought ruin upon itself.

Making sense out of human flaws

Left out of plague accounts are the names of the multitudes who died in them. Homer, Sophocles and Thucydides tell us that masses died. But plagues in ancient narratives are usually the beginning, not the end of the story. A plague didn’t stop the Trojan War, prevent Oedipus’ sons from waging civil war or give the Athenians enough reasons to make peace.

For years after the ravages of the plague, Athens still suffered from in-fighting, toxic politics and selfish leaders. Popular politics led to the disastrous Sicilian Expedition of 415 B.C., killing thousands of Athenians – but still Athens survived.

A decade later, the Athenians again broke into civil factions and eventually prosecuted their own generals after a naval victory in 406 B.C. at Arginusae. In 404 B.C., after a siege, Sparta defeated Athens. But, as we learn from Greek myth, it was – again – really Athens’ leaders and people who defeated themselves.

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Joel Christensen, Associate Professor of Classical Studies, Brandeis University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.