We can leave aside those presidents tried for crimes against humanity and massacres, such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq (executed in 2006) or Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia. Trump rode roughshod over people’s civil rights, including in Portland, Or. and Lafayette Park, but those are not among the charges against him. He stands accused of sedition and conspiracy to overturn an election. There also isn’t a good parallel to South Korea, which has routinely tried and imprisoned former presidents on embezzlement and corruption charges. Although there are questions about whether the Trumps illicitly used the White House to enrich themselves further, DJT is not being tried on those grounds.

The closes parallel is former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, who faces as many as 16 trials, one of which began in June. He is charged with spreading misinformation about the election in the months leading up to it. If found guilty he could be barred from politics for 8 years.

In 2019, former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf was convicted of treason because he had suspended the country’s constitution in 2007. Musharraf made a military coup against elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999 and held a phony referendum, whereby he because president. This is not so hard since in a referendum you have no opponent and the only candidate people can vote for is you. Musharraf was not the first military dictator to make himself president of Pakistan, in fact he was the fourth, after Generals Ayyub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia ul-Haq.

Musharraf, however, went further than ruling according to provisions in the constitution for a national emergency. In 2007 he dismissed the Supreme Court and replaced it with one to his liking, and in November of that year he actually set aside the constitution, restoring it a month later, in December.

Pakistan was in so much turmoil that Musharraf couldn’t control the situation, so he agreed to the holding of new elections in 2008, won by Asaf Ali Zardari after his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated. Musharraf went into exile. The legal establishment, however, still minded his attempt to tinker with it and in 2013 they began proceedings against him for treason in connection with his suspension of the constitution. In 2019 the trial in absentia wrapped up with Musharraf being sentenced to death. The pawerful Pakistani officer corps had lobbied against one of their own being treated like this, but to no avail. Musharraf was sentenced to death in absentia, given that he lived in Dubai then. He died on Feb. 5, 2023.

Since US prosecutors have not considered Trump’s crimes to constitute a form of treason, he does not face the death penalty, though he is 77, so he could easily die in jail if he is convicted and imprisoned. In Georgia, he can’t get less than five years if he is convicted of the racketeering and other charges, because of mandatory sentencing guidelines. He also cannot be paroled or pardoned before spending 5 years in prison.

An Atlanta, Georgia, grand jury indicted former President Donald Trump on Aug. 14, 2023, charging him with racketeering and 12 other felonies related to his alleged attempts to overturn his 2020 election defeat in the state.

Eighteen of Trump’s allies and associates, including former Trump attorney Rudolph Giuliani and former White House chief of staff Mark Meadows, were also indicted for racketeering and other felony charges for their alleged involvement in the scheme.

This marks Trump’s fourth indictment in five months – and the second to come from his efforts to undo the election results that awarded the presidency to Joe Biden. Fani Willis, the district attorney of Fulton County, Georgia, started investigating Trump’s involvement in this alleged scheme, as well as that of Trump’s colleagues, in February 2021.

In January 2021, one month before the investigation started, Trump placed a phone call to Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and pressed him to “find” enough votes to overturn Biden’s win.

The Conversation U.S. spoke with Anthony Michael Kreis, a scholar of Georgia’s election laws, to understand the significance of the charges laid out in the 98-page indictment. Here are five key points to understand about the precise nature of the charges and why racketeering is at the center of them.

1. Racketeering is different from conspiracy charges

With a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, or RICO, charge, Willis presents a narrative that there were a large number of people involved in this case, but that they didn’t necessarily sit down at some point and over cocktails and say, “We are going to engage in this criminal act,” which would be a traditional conspiracy case. She is painting this picture of people winking and nodding and working toward this end goal of overthrowing the election, but without some kind of expressed agreement.

The Georgia RICO law allows her to rope in a lot of people who allegedly were involved with this kind of approach.

To be able to bring conspiracy charges, she would have to have an expressed agreement and a concrete act in furtherance of that conspiracy. And here there really wasn’t quite a plan – it is essentially a loose organization of people who are all up to no good.

2. Georgia – and Willis – have used racketeering charges before

Traditionally in Georgia, RICO has been used to prosecute people engaged in very violent kinds of activity – for street gangs and the Mafia, in particular. It has also been used in other contexts.

Beirut (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – Lebanon may be a small country of some four million citizens with a land area a little less than that of Connecticut, but it plays an outsized role in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Its upcoming presidential election on June 14^th therefore has wide domestic and regional implications. The presidency carries significant implications for Lebanon’s delicate electoral landscape and the distribution of power among its religious and political factions. It will be the twelfth attempt by the Parliament to elect a president. Previous attempts have failed to secure two-thirds of the total 128 parliamentary votes in the first round or a simple majority in subsequent rounds.

Host to as many as 1.5 million Syrian refugees, Lebanon’s government and its policies have implications for the future of its larger neighbor. The country is an economic basket case, with charges of peculation at its national bank, and it suffers from long-term infrastructural damage to its main port because of a massive ammonium nitrate fertilizer explosion in 2020. — the third biggest explosion in modern history after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A middle income country only a few years ago, Lebanon has fallen so low that now some 80 percent of its population lives below the poverty line.  

The government is often deadlocked by sectarian struggles. Many in Lebanon’s powerful Christian minority are tied to the west, though some factions are allied with the Shiite Hezbollah Party. About a third of its population is composed of Shiites, many tilting toward Iran or Iraq.  It also has a big block of Sunnis, who identify with the wider Sunni Arab world and are open to influences from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  Social and political conventions dictate that the president always be Christian.  But some presidents have been closer to Damascus and some closer to Paris and Washington—Lebanese Christians are diverse.

Former Finance Minister Jihad Azour, who served as director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund, has emerged as the favorite of most Christian parties. He is, however, disliked by Hezbollah and Amal, the two parties representing Lebanon’s Shiites. It is possible that Azour will nevertheless gain a swell of support.

Suleiman Frangieh, 57, head of the Marada Movement and a favorite of Hezbollah, has also traditionally enjoyed strong support from the Syrian regime. However, signs of waning political relevance suggest the influence of Damascus may be diminishing. This change points to the shifting dynamics of power within Lebanon, emphasizing the challenges faced by long-standing factions.

On the other hand, Azour’s front has garnered substantial domestic support and relies on international backing. However, critics have charged that the media is being manipulated in his favor and have suggested that it is because of external interference.  This critique adds an extra layer of complexity to the electoral landscape. It remains to be seen how these external influences will impact the outcome and shape Lebanon’s political future.

One cannot ignore the role of established influential figures and factions in Lebanon’s presidential race. The long-serving Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, a leader of the moderate Shiite Amal Party, displays a knack for political maneuvering and safeguarding personal interests. He would try to put his thumb on the scale for Frangieh. However, his influence on shaping the election outcome must be weighed against other factions’ aspirations for a more inclusive governance model.

Considering the complexity and fluidity of Lebanon’s electoral landscape, it is always possible for a third “surprise” nominee to emerge and have an impact the presidential election. Lebanese politics often witness unexpected developments and the rise of new candidates who capture domestic and international attention and support. Therefore, while the analysis focuses on key players and established factions, it is critical to remain open to the possibility of a third candidate entering the race.

Lebanon’s delicate balance of power requires that the next president unite diverse communities and navigate intricate sectarian divisions. This task calls for a leader who can foster inclusive governance while addressing religious and political factions’ concerns and aspirations. Striking a balance between competing interests is essential to preventing further divisions and promoting national unity.

Lebanon has long been influenced by external actors, which adds another layer of complexity to its electoral landscape. The successful candidate must possess the diplomatic acumen to protect Lebanon’s national interests while fostering productive relationships with international partners. Balancing national sovereignty and international support will be crucial for the next president.

The presidential election outcome extends beyond politics. It has the potential to have an impact Lebanon’s economic recovery and structural reforms. A capable and determined president can play a pivotal role in advancing much-needed reforms and steering the country toward stability. Additionally, establishing an independent presidency can provide an opportunity to overcome political paralysis and create a more effective government that addresses Lebanon’s economic challenges.

Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election holds tremendous significance for the country’s political future. Balancing sectarian interests, navigating external influences, and preserving national unity are critical factors that will shape the election outcome. The chosen president will need strong leadership, diplomatic finesse, and a commitment to inclusive governance to guide Lebanon through its challenges. As Lebanon strives for stability and prosperity, transparent and a fair electoral process that reflects the people’s will is paramount. Sadly, the possibility has to be admitted that the deadlocked Lebanese political system will yet again fail to produce a president, leaving the hapless country rudderless yet again.

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ANKARA, TURKIYE- JUNE 3: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first received his mandate from MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, as the temporary chairman of the Parliament, and then took the oath at the General Assembly on June 3, 2023 in Ankara, Türkiye. Re-elected President once again in the 28 May election, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s duty, which he will continue until 2028, has officially started. The first ceremony was held in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.(Photo by Ugur Yildirim/ dia images via Getty Images).

Türkiye finds itself in a deep economic crisis, which most analysts agree has been worsened by Erdoğan’s unorthodox economic policies and his spending spree before the election. The months before the electoral contest were also marked by the earthquake that shook south-eastern Türkiye and northern Syria, leaving over 50,000 people dead on the Turkish side of the border alone. In the aftermath of the natural disaster, multiple reports showed that the low construction standards condoned by local authorities and the Turkish government resulted in avoidable deaths.

Erdoğan and his center-right AKP have worked over the years to create an institutional and media environment that facilitates their repeated electoral successes. According to an observation mission of the Turkish elections conducted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent.” However, the strategic mistakes of the opposition also need to be considered to understand why they failed to unseat Erdoğan at his moment of maximum weakness. It has been noted that Kılıçdaroğlu’s promises to assign vice presidential positions to the different party leaders of the opposition coalition sent a confusing message to the Turkish population regarding who would be in charge if the opposition won. The contrast with Erdoğan’s personalist platform was certainly stark. Even so, if skillfully communicated along the lines of “unity in diversity”, the collective leadership of the opposition platform could have proven a strength rather than a weakness.

In contrast, it was known long before the election campaign started that Kılıçdaroğlu was not the best presidential candidate for the opposition. Different polls from early 2022 to early 2023 showed that CHP politicians Ekrem Imamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara respectively, were far more popular than Kılıçdaroğlu. In December 2022, a judicial ruling banned Imamoğlu from politics (he has been able to stay in office while appealing the decision) for referring to members of the Turkish supreme election council as “fools.” Imamoğlu’s accusations came after the members of the council forced a repetition of the 2019 local elections in Istanbul, which Imamoğlu won by a wider margin than the initial elections that were declared void. Imamoğlu’s legal problems clearly affected his chances of running for president, but Yavaş did not have any obvious impediment.

If Erdoğan was the personification of victory, in discursive terms the triumph went for anti-immigration positions. In fact, the reason Erdoğan failed to win the election in the first round, as he had done in 2014 and 2018, was the strong showing of the ultra-nationalist Sinan Oğan, who received 5.2% of the votes. Oğan’s campaign largely revolved  around promises to send back Syrian refugees living in Türkiye – according to the Turkish government, 3.7 million Syrian refugees out of a total of 5.5 million foreigners live in the country. Oğan found fertile ground in a country that has seen the emergence of deadly assaults on refugees and immigrant neighborhoods during the last years. When recently polled on the subject of Syrian refugees, more than 88.5% of Turks demonstrated that they want them to return to their country.

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Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu attends a swearing-in ceremony at the Turkish parliament in Ankara, June 2, 2023. (Photo by Adem ALTAN / AFP) (Photo by ADEM ALTAN/AFP via Getty Images)

The runoff contest had almost become a formality after the first-round results: 49.5% of the vote went for Erdoğan and 44.9% for Kılıçdaroğlu, which put the AKP leader half a point away from victory. The impressively high turnout, at 87.4%, meant that the opposition’s options to mobilize citizens who had not participated in the first round were very limited. To complicate matters further, after the first round the opposition lost a few key days involved in recriminations, the restructuring of the election campaign team, and carving up a new strategy for the runoff. The despair within the opposition camp was closely related to the high expectations generated by the majority of pre-election polls, which suggested Kılıçdaroğlu would emerge on top after the first round.

Once the soul-searching came to an end, the next step was the pursuit of Oğan’s votes to have a slight chance in the runoff. There were rumors that the opposition offered Oğan to head a new migration ministry or even the vice presidency if he were to support Kılıçdaroğlu in the second round. At the end, he sided with Erdoğan although the Turkish President did not appear to make any concession to him. Oğan probably saw Erdoğan was going to win regardless of his decision and preferred to back the strongest force. The opposition had to content itself with the support of Umit Ozdag, the leader of the far-right Victory Party, which had been the main party in the alliance that backed Oğan’s candidacy in the first round.

Although both the government and the opposition coalition promised to send refugees back to Syria, the anti-refugee discourse has been “much more prominent” in the opposition camp, explains Chatham House Associate Fellow Galip Dalay. During the two weeks between the first round and the runoff election, Kılıçdaroğlu stepped up his anti-refugee messages. Six days before the second round, in a rally in the province of Hatay, which borders Syria, Kılıçdaroğlu exhorted his audience to “make up your mind before refugees take over the country.” Hatay would go on to become the only province in Türkiye where there was a shift of winner: Kılıçdaroğlu won the first round, Erdoğan the second.

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ISTANBUL, TURKEY – MAY 29: Members of the public are seen near the Hagia Sophia the day after Erdogan was re-elected to presidency on May 29, 2023 in Istanbul, Turkey. On Sunday, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won another 5-year term after he was forced into a runoff election with the opposition politician Kemal Kilicdaroglu. Erdogan prevailed despite criticism of his management of the country’s economy and the government’s response to the devastating earthquakes earlier this year. (Photo by Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images).

The roadmap to gain Oğan’s vote was not a complete failure, but the opposition needed around 90% of Oğan’s votes to win the election if turnout had remained constant – a possibility that became even more distant as turnout fell by 3.1% in the second round. This meant Erdoğan needed a lesser number of votes to overcome the 50% mark in the runoff election. In fact, the 27.13 million votes Erdoğan received in the first round (as compared to 27.83 million votes in the second) would have been enough to win the second round with over 51% of the valid votes.

Three different provinces illustrate the limited success of the opposition in winning over Oğan voters. In both Kayseri and Bilecik, Oğan received more than 8% of the vote, far above the national average of 5.2%. In the second round, the share of the vote for Kılıçdaroğlu increased at the same rate as Erdoğan’s in Kayseri while Kılıçdaroğlu’s gains in Bilecik were only slightly bigger – 1.6% more than Erdoğan. Something similar happened in Bursa, a far more important province in electoral terms as it is Türkiye’s fourth in number of population. In this western region, Oğan received 7.4% of the vote in the first round. In the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu’s share of the vote increased by 4.5% and Erdoğan’s by 3%.

The opposition did a better job in Istanbul and Ankara, the two largest metropolitan areas, where its margin of victory doubled, but the differences remained too small to compensate for Erdoğan’s overwhelming wins in Central Anatolia and the Black Sea region. Furthermore, Ozdag’s Victory Party support for the opposition proved to have negative consequences in the Kurdish-majority areas of Türkiye. This is something several analysts had expected given the Victory party’s strong anti-Kurdish views. In Diyarbakır, Van, and Mardin, the most populated Kurdish provinces won by Kılıçdaroğlu in the first round, the opposition’s candidate lost between 0.3 and 1% of the vote in the runoff election. The number of votes for Erdoğan in these provinces hardly increased, but the fall in the turnout rate was higher than the national average of 3.1% – 6% in Diyarbakır and Van, 4% in Mardin – suggesting the opposition failed to re-mobilize some of the voters who had previously voted for Kılıçdaroğlu.

Part of the problem for Kılıçdaroğlu was that most of the support he received in the Kurdish areas in the first round consisted of tactical voting. The first round of the presidential election was held together with the parliamentary elections, which the opposition lost to the AKP and its ultra-nationalist ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The pro-Kurdish and left-wing Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) called for HDP supporters to back Kılıçdaroğlu in the presidential election, forgoing putting up their own presidential candidate as they had done in the past. In the parliamentary elections, however, the HDP put forward its candidates under the umbrella of the Green Left Party (YSP), which gained close to 9% of the vote and was the strongest political force in 13 south-eastern provinces. It is reasonable to assume that a significant number of Kurdish voters who had split their vote for Kılıçdaroğlu and the YSP in the first round decided to stay at home for the second round, especially considering Kılıçdaroğlu’s reach-out to the anti-Kurdish Victory Party.

Erdoğan and his AKP had probably never been weaker than they were in the run-up to these recent parliamentary and presidential elections. Consequently, the opposition has strong reasons to believe it has missed an incomparable opportunity. Under the new presidential system, Erdoğan will not be allowed to run for president again in 2028 due to a two-term limit. Even so, the difficulties for the opposition arising from “the lack of a level playing field” in Turkish elections will likely only have increased by 2028. Considering the results of the second round of the presidential election, the CHP is in a good position to maintain the mayorships of Istanbul and Ankara in the 2024 local elections. But even if these good prospects for the opposition materialize, these wins will have a sour taste with four more years to go until the next presidential and parliamentary elections.

The unequal playing field gave the incumbent an unjustified advantage

Written byArzu Geybullayeva

( Globalvoices.org) -Showing up at a polling station, as one of the two presidential candidates, in a country-wide election with a pocket full of cash may not occur to leaders of democratic countries, but in Turkey, that is what the newly re-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did on May 28. The incumbent president was seen handing out TRY 200 banknotes (USD 10) to his supporters amid cheering and blessings.
In Turkey, campaigning on an election day is prohibited, but given the unequal playing field in the run-up to both elections on May 14 and May 28, it is unlikely that President Erdoğan will face any repercussions. The same applies to countless violations documented by the Turkey-based Human Rights Association (İHD). According to their report, there was violence and vote rigging observed across Turkey on May 28. In Hatay, observers documented mass voting, while in other provinces, representatives of the main opposition CHP faced violence. According to the association, there were also instances in provinces where men voted on behalf of women or pre-stamped ballots were brought from outside. The association said:

In the light of the initial data Human Rights Association (İHD) has received and those reported in the press, it has been determined that violations including mass and open voting, obstruction of observers and party representatives, and physical violence took place in the presidential election runoff. İHD calls on all public authorities, especially the Supreme Electoral Board, to fulfill their duties in accordance with human rights standards in order to ensure fair elections.

On June 1, the Supreme Electoral Board announced the official results of the second round of presidential elections. According to the results, President Erdoğan received 52.18 percent of the votes while his opponent, Kılıçdaroğlu received 47.82 percent.

Predictions for the next five years

Already, a day after the election on May 29, the country witnessed a price hike on gas and alcoholic beverages as well as reports of medical professionals looking to leave the country. According to the Turkish Medical Association (TBB), an independent medical and health professional association, data from March 2022, some 4,000 doctors have left the country in the last ten years. The new data shared by the association showed the number of medical professionals wanting to leave in the first five months of 2023 reached 1,025. But it won’t be just the doctors leaving. According to a survey by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung conducted among Turkish youth to evaluate their social and political opinions, “a significant proportion, 63 percent of young people, expressed a desire to live in another country if given the opportunity,” citing worsening living conditions and declining freedom in Turkey as main reasons for this decision.

Already, there are signs that Turks, from all walks of life — especially those with little children — intend to seek opportunities abroad. Among those wanting to leave are those fearing persecution by the new leadership.

Supporters of the ruling party celebrate the victory on May 28. Image by Aziz Karimov. Used with permission.

There is also the economy and the slumping of the national currency, the Turkish Lira, against the dollar. According to Morgan Stanley analysts, lest President Erdoğan reverses his policy of low-interest rates, the lira could face a 29 percent slump by the end of 2023. On June 3, Erdoğan is set to announce the new cabinet. Among them, is former Minister of Finance, Mehmet Simsek, who is expected to take over all of Turkey’s economic policies, according to reporting by Bloomberg. Pundits say Simsek’s inclusion within the new cabinet is a move that could help prop up Turkey’s struggling economy:

The economy is not the only area where Turkey is likely to see further problems, according to Daron Acemoğlu, a faculty member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In a detailed thread on Twitter, Acemoğlu noted judicial independence “was very bad and probably cannot get much worse.” There is also the media environment. According to Acemoğlu while he does not anticipate “a complete ban on all dissident voices,” the conditions may worsen if the state anticipates introducing further “controls on social media.” Acemoğlu also anticipates further erosion of “autonomy and impartiality of bureaucracy and security services,” as well as challenges imposed against civil society and freedoms more broadly.

Some of the restrictions on media were quick to follow. On May 30, The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) also known as the chief censor in Turkey, launched an investigation against six opposition television channels over their coverage of the elections.

After securing another victory, President Erdoğan delivered a divisive election speech. Speaking to his supporters who gathered at the presidential palace in Ankara, he called the jailed leader of the Kurdish HDP party a terrorist and promised to keep Demirtaş behind bars. During the speech, his supporters began calling for Demirtaş’s execution. In December 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey must immediately release the Kurdish politician. The politician was placed behind bars in November 2016, and if convicted, could face 142 years in prison. The charges leveled against him are being a leader of a terrorist organization, an accusation Demirtaş has denied.

There is also the case of Can Atalay, the newly elected member of parliament, representing the Workers Party, who remains behind bars, despite Atalay’s lawyers’ attempts to free him. All newly elected parliament members are expected to attend the swearing-in ceremony on June 2.

Journalists Union of Turkey (TGS) President Gökhan Durmuş was closely watching the President’s victory speech and released a statement expressing his concern about the divisive nature of the next government and the implications on press freedom in the country.

However, in an atmosphere where the society is divided exactly in two, it will only be possible to continue to be in power by continuing the oppressive policies. And President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already signaled to the whole society in his balcony speech that this will be their choice.

The future of the opposition alliance

While at first, it was unclear what will happen to the opposition alliance, also known as the Table of Six, the past few days indicate divisions within the group. Uğur Poyraz, the Secretary General of the IYI Party and one of the members of the Table of Six said on June 1, “The name of this alliance is the electoral alliance; when the election is over, the alliance will also disappear. As of May 28, the electoral alliance ended.” But not all members of the alliance share the same sentiments. In a video address shared via Twitter, the leader of Gelecek Party Ahmet Davutoğlu encouraged supporters of the alliance “not to fall into despair or possible provocations,” adding, that those who supported the ruling government and its alliance did so not because they accepted the status quo but due to an environment of fear.

Other members of the alliance, such as the leader of the Felicity party Temel Karamollaoğlu took it to Twitter, where he criticized the ruling government for the polarization, asking whether it was all worth it. “Was it really worth it, declaring half of our nation ‘terrorists, enemies of religion, traitors,’ in return for this result you have achieved? Was it worth all the lies, slander, and insults,” wrote Karamollaoğlu.

The latter was also reflected in a joint statement issued by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) observers:

The second round of Türkiye’s presidential election was characterized by increasingly inflammatory and discriminatory language during the campaign period. Media bias and ongoing restrictions to freedom of expression created an unlevel playing field, and contributed to an unjustified advantage of the incumbent.

The blame game

Many blamed the opposition alliance and its leader for failing to secure victory in these elections but according to Gönül Tol, the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s Turkey program and a senior fellow with the Black Sea Program it is not as simple as that and that fear factor played a significant role. In a Twitter thread, Tol alluded to a handful of complexities that determined the outcomes of these elections. From elections being unfree and unfair, to both pro-democracy and President Erdoğan’s alliance having “existential anxieties,” with both sides seeing the elections “as a war of survival.”  Tol explained:

In such polarized contexts, people do not change their voting behavior easily based on policy preferences, incumbent’s performance or opposition’s promises. Going for the other guy rather than sticking with the devil you know is too big of a risk to take, especially in the face of such dramatic uncertainty. That is why Erdoğan continues to polarize the country.

As for the fear factor, Tol noted that President Erdoğan’s victory speech, was “the most aggressive” to date, “because that is how autocrats cling to power against unfavorable odds. They stoke fear and frame elections as a war for survival. That is how they prevent defections. That is how they can still muster majorities even when they fail to deliver.”

Writing for T24, academic and journalist Haluk Şahin explained that the outcomes of these elections were “determined not by economics and sociology, but by social psychology. In other words, a choice driven by subconscious and subconscious fears, identities, denials, jealousies, desires for worship, and ambitions to dominate.”

Others like political scientist Umut Özkırımlı explained that in order to “to topple an authoritarian regime at the ballot box” two things are needed, “sizeable electoral majorities” and “populist and ethnonationalist strategies” referring to an essay by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s The New Competitive Authoritarianism. In the essay, the authors argue:

Tilting the playing field in countries such as Hungary, the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela requires greater skill, more sophisticated strategies, and far more extensive popular mobilization … Prospective autocrats must first command sizeable electoral majorities, and then deploy plebiscitarian or hypermajoritarian strategies to change the constitutional and electoral rules of the game so as to weaken opponents. This is often achieved via polarizing populist or ethnonationalist strategies.

With local elections months away (Turkey is to hold mayoral elections in March 2024) academic Orçun Selçuk said the opposition should stick to “playing the long game”:

Calls for solidarity

On the night of election, as Erdoğan supporters, roamed the streets of Turkey, celebrating into the early hours of the morning, the other half of the country, did not hesitate in shaking off the outcome and calling to keep on fighting.

 

Acclaimed musician, Fazil Say, tweeted on May 29, “No demoralizing, friends, let’s embrace life. Keep up the goodness. Life goes on, music goes on, the world goes on, endless continuation to create and produce beauty.”

 

Well-known entrepreneur Selçuk Gerger, posted on his Instagram, that despite all the struggle, things did not change. “As of today, I will continue to live as I was living in Istanbul in the previous months and years, without regrets or stepping aside. I will not give up even for a moment. We won’t hide. The majority of people born and who grew up in this country are on our side. And yes, today we are really just starting our fight. Let’s not get hide!”

Via Globalvoices.org

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been reelected as president, ensuring that his term as leader of Turkey will extend to a quarter century.

The electorate returned Erdoğan to power in a runoff vote on May 28, 2023, with 52% of votes. But with 48% of voters siding with opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Erdoğan will have to govern a divided nation in its centennial year.

As a professor of political science, I have analyzed Turkish politics for many years. The election provided a stark choice for Turkey’s voters: To end or extend Erdogan’s two-decade-long creep toward authoritarian-style governance. The decision to opt for the latter will dictate the country’s future in key ways, both domestically and in terms of its relationships with Western countries.

What’s next for Turkey’s political system?

Turkey had its first democratic election in May 1950. Since then it has had a multiparty competitive system, albeit one that has been sporadically interrupted by several military coups.

In the last 10 years, Erdoğan has taken Turkey down a more autocratic, one-man-rule style of governance. This has included restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of the press and free assembly.

There is a little reason to believe that Erdoğan, enboldened by a fresh mandate, will reverse this trajectory.

Erdoğan won the election without making any promises about restoring or expanding rights and freedoms. Rather, his campaign signaled an intention to continue Turkey’s path toward being a conservative, religious state – a far cry from the vision of a modern, secular nation of founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

In the run-up to the election, Erdoğan presented himself as the leader of religious conservatives – reciting the Quran in Hagia Sophia and addressing the people in another mosque following the Friday prayer. He also presented himself as a militarist leader, using battleships, drones and other weapons as campaign instruments and uploading a new Twitter profile photo with an air force pilot jacket. This posturing combined with his accusations that the opposition was collaborating with the PKK – a Kurdish separatist organization designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey – suggests that Erdoğan continues to promote Turkish nationalism and militarism.

The runoff victory for Erdoğan comes just two weeks after his Justice and Development Party and coalition partners won a parliamentary majority. It means that the opposition will have no executive or legislative power to restrict Erdoğan’s agenda.

Future relations with the U.S. and the West

Another important and consistent characteristic of Erdoğan’s presidential campaign was his criticism of the West in general and the United States in particular.

Erdoğan has accused the U.S. of a variety of perceived slights and Washington’s stance on issues affecting Turkey. In the past year, the Turkish leader has criticized over Washington’s support of the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdish PKK and protested the deployment of U.S. armored vehicles on two Greek Islands. Meanwhile, he has pointedly distanced himself from NATO allies on the issue of Russian sanctions, and instead talked up Turkey’s “special relationship” with Russia.

In mid-April, Erdoğan framed the election as a chance for voters to “send a message to the West” which, he claimed, was supporting the opposition candidate. “This country does not look at what the West says, neither when fighting terrorism nor in determining its economic policies,” he said.

Some of this was campaign rhetoric. And Erdoğan may make some attempts to heal rifts with Western countries, such as approving Sweden’s NATO membership bid – something he has to date refused to do over what Turkey sees as the Nordic country’s harboring of Kurdish terrorists.

But even such a concession would not amount to a transformation of Erdoğan’s deeply critical attitude to Western countries overall.

Indeed, the only factor that may force Erdoğan to return Turkey to a pro-Western position is Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis – which might necessitate the support of wealthy Western states and institutions.

What’s next for Turkey’s shaky economy?

Since 2018, the Turkish economy has shown symptoms of a crisis. Turkey’s currency, the lira, has fallen in value precipitously. In March, it fell to a new low of 19 to the dollar. Moreover, in 2022, the annual inflation rate surpassed 80%.

In order to win the elections, Erdoğan pursued several policies that appealed to voters but may further stress the economy and bleed national reserves. They include dropping the retirement age and giving a 45% pay raise to public workers.

Meanwhile, economic crisis and authoritarian policies have resulted in a “brain drain” with many educated young people moving to Western European countries.

If the election result leads to a further exodus of skilled, educated workers, then it will only weaken Turkey’s capability of confronting its economic crisis. Such thinking could nudge Erdoğan towards a rethink over policies that alienate younger, secular Turks.

It could also force Erdoğan to reevaluate his foreign policy. At present, the Turkish leader has looked to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Russia for financial support. If this appears to be insufficient, Erdoğan may be forced to seek stronger relations with the United States to facilitate financial aid from the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations.

Erdoğan won the election without making any promises of change regarding domestic or foreign policy. But if the economic crisis he faces fails to abate, change may be forced upon him.

Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Recep Tayyib Erdogan will remain president of Turkey for another five years after winning Sunday’s run-off election over his long-time rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. If he serves the full five-year term, he will have held power for 26 years – almost the entire history of Turkey in the 21st century.

What is astonishing is how the majority of Turkish people elected Erdogan despite a worsening economy and now chronic hyperinflation that would likely bring down any government in a democratic country.

So, how did Erdogan win the election and, more significantly, what is likely to happen in the country in the foreseeable future?

Free but far from fair

The election was free in that political parties could put forth nominees on their own and carry out campaigns. Parties also had the right to have representatives in every polling station to ensure the votes were counted correctly. And voters were free to vote.

However, the election was far from fair.

First, a potential leading rival in the race, Ekrem Imamoglu, was sentenced in December to more than two years in prison on a charge of “insulting public figures”.

Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul, dealt Erdogan’s party a rare defeat in the 2019 Istanbul elections. Polls had shown he could win against Erdogan in the presidential election by a comfortable margin.

Some argue the court ruling was politically motivated. With Imamoglu out of the picture, the opposition had to coalesce behind Kilicdaroglu, the weakest of all possible high-profile candidates.

Via Pixabay.

Erdogan also has an almost ubiquitous grip over the Turkish media, engineered through Fahrettin Altun, the head of media and communication at the presidential palace.

Turkish media are either directly owned by Erdogan’s relatives, such as the popular Sabah newspaper managed by Sedat Albayrak, or controlled through managing editors appointed and monitored by Altun. Some independent internet news sites such as T24 practice self-censorship in order to remain operational.

With this massive media control, Erdogan and his men ensured he had the most television airtime. Erdogan was depicted in the media as a world leader advancing Turkey by building airports, roads and bridges. He was put in front of dozens of journalists on TV, but all the questions were prepared in advance and Erdogan read his answers through a prompter.

Altun also orchestrated a massive smear campaign against Kilicdaroglu. The opposition leader received minimal airtime, and when he was in the media, he was depicted as an inept leader unfit to rule the country.

Altun not only controlled the conventional TV channels and print media, but also social media. On Twitter, a very influential platform in Turkey, Altun used bots and an army of paid trolls and influencers to seek to control the dialogue.

And it worked. Sufficient number of voters were swayed through confusion and fear that the country would be far worse if Kilicdaroglu was elected.

Lastly, there was the potential for fraud due to the non-transparent way the election results are processed. Once each ballot box is counted, the ballot and result sheet are transported by police in cities and the military in regional areas to the electoral commission. Both the police and military are under Erdogan’s tight control.

The results are then reported only through the state-owned Anadolu Agency, while in the past they were reported by multiple independent agencies.

Even if no evidence of fraud emerges in this election, the spectre could put in doubt the integrity of the entire electoral process.

Staunch support from religious voters

There are two other factors that were decisive in the elections.

The first is the support Erdogan received from Sinan Ogan, who was third in the first round of the presidential election two weeks ago, with 5.2% of the votes. Erdogan persuaded Ogan to throw his support to him.

The second and most important factor was the way Erdogan was viewed in an almost mythical fashion by conservative and religious voters. For them, Erdogan is a religious hero and saviour.

The religious population in Turkey has long suffered persecution in the name of secularism. For them, Kilicdaroglu and his Republican People’s Party symbolised that persecution. Although Kilicdaroglu abandoned the party’s previous strict secular policies, these voters never forgave it for preventing Muslim women from wearing the head scarf in educational and state institutions and keeping religion out of public life and politics for decades.

The conservative and religious right in Turkey sees Erdogan as a world leader and a hero who struggled against ill-intentioned forces, both internally and externally, to make Turkey great again.

What is likely to happen in Turkey post-election?

Turkey desperately needed a change of government and a breath of fresh air. Now the social, political and economic suffocation is likely to get worse.

Erdogan had promised a Turkish revival by 2023, which is the 100th anniversary of the republic’s founding. Turkey was supposed to enter the top 10 economies in the world by then. However, Turkey barely sits in the top 20, at 19th.

The economy has experienced a significant downturn in the past three years. The Turkish lira has plummeted in value, leading to a dollar-based economy.

But dollars are hard to come by. The Turkish Central Bank kept the economy afloat by emptying its reserves in the last few months for the elections. The Central Bank has been running a current account deficit of US$8-10 billion dollars every month, and its reserves last week fell into the negative for the first time since 2002.

Now Erdogan has to find money. He will resort to high interest foreign loans and embark on a diplomatic spree of the oil-rich Muslim countries to draw some of their funds to Turkey. The uncertainty around how successful these endeavours will be and their likely short-term gain may throw the Turkish economy into recession.

Ff the Turkish economy slips into recession, it could mean massive unemployment and a reduced standard of living. The inflation rate had reached a 24-year high of 85.5% last year, and may go even higher, as the cash-strapped government continues to print digital money to pay for its large bureaucratic workforce.

On foreign policy, Erdogan will continue to try to become a regional power independent of NATO, the European Union and the US. He will likely continue to strengthen Turkey’s ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which has been a worry for Turkey’s Western allies.

What does the future hold?

This will be Erdogan’s absolute last term in office, according to the Turkish constitution, and it could possibly be cut short.

The 69-year-old president has many health problems. He is becoming increasingly physically frail, finding it hard to walk, and his speech often slurs. In coming years, his health may get worse and he may have to hand over his presidency to a trusted deputy.

The other possibility is that potential leaders in his party could decide to carry out a party coup to topple Erdogan before his term is up, so they can garner public support ahead of the 2028 presidential election.

While there may be some political stability in post-election Turkey for now, the country will be in economic, social and political turmoil for the foreseeable future.

Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has ruled Turkey for the last 21 years. In the first few terms of his rule, Turkey experienced significant economic growth and a reduction in inequality. This was widely believed to be a reason for Erdoğan’s long-term popularity.

However, inflation hit a 24-year high of 85.5% in November 2022, creating speculation that economic instability would count against Erdoğan in the 2023 general election.

Despite this, in the first round of the election Erdoğan attracted 49.5% of the vote. Some argued that what Erdoğan calls his “great achievements” in science and technology were a significant reason for his continued popularity.

In the weeks before the first round, Erdoğan made a flurry of announcements about his “great achievements” and upcoming projects. He unveiled plans for Turkey to send its first astronaut to the International Space Station by the end of the year. The Teknofest Aerospace and Technology Festival was held to showcase many of these projects to the public. Erdoğan also showed off Turkey’s new multipurpose amphibious assault ship and a new Turkish armed drone, capable of taking off from aircraft carriers.

Erdoğan clearly hoped that these announcements would boost his popularity, by creating an image of Turkey becoming a world leader in science and technology. Erdoğan’s government also oversaw the country’s Black Sea natural gas pipeline project, an attempt to make Turkey energy independent. And more than £55 billion had been invested in the national defence industry as part of a plan to make Turkey a world leader in defence products.

Creating Turkey’s own car

Although the car industry has had an important role in Turkey’s economy, it has been dominated by foreign car companies. But the idea of having a national car brand has had a long history. In 1961 the military government attempted to develop the first Turkish car, Devrim, as a symbol of modern Turkey, but it was not very successful. This desire for a Turkish national car was even made into a popular film.

In 2017, Erdoğan invited six business groups to produce a 100% domestic and national car by 2023, a year that marked the 100th anniversary of Turkey’s republic as well as being an election year.

The six business groups and the ministry of science, technology and industry formed Türkiye’s Automobile Joint Venture Group (Togg) in 2019, aiming to build the first fully Turkish-made car, which was also going to be an electric vehicle. Togg received the highest support package believed to have been given to any automotive firm in Europe and North America (about £2.8 billion).

Despite the extensive financial support and hype, the Togg car could not be “100% domestic and national” because domestic suppliers didn’t have the capacity to make the key parts. Crucial complex and expensive components, such as the battery, had to be imported.

In the end, only 51% of the Togg car was domestically sourced. This led to a change in the way it was described, rather than a “100% domestic and national” car Erdoğan began calling it “the car of Türkiye” and claimed the product as a Turkish industrial win.

Social costs

With political economists Gabor Scheiring and Tamas Gerocs I have been investigating the implications of the policies related to Turkey’s car industry on social and economic development. Policy interventions that led to the development of Togg and Erdoğan’s other “achievements” came at the expense of workers. Changes during the Erdoğan years made subcontracting legal for big firms, resulting in more insecure and low-paid employment.

The number of unionised workers in the car industry dropped from 68% to just 17% between 2003-23. Labour rights abuses were reported in Togg’s plant.

Most people in Turkey are unable to afford to buy a new average car, let alone the Togg car, which will be sold for Turkish lira 953,000 (£38,500). This is about 112 times the minimum wage. More than 70% of workers in Turkey earn the minimum wage or less.

Togg received extensive public support despite its inability to keep the promise of a 100% Turkish car and deteriorating working conditions. In a survey, 94% of the population supported the initiative and this support was primarily based on nationalist and patriotic grounds, such as “helping one’s own country”.

The car was portrayed as a major success that would add “success to Turkey’s list of ongoing achievements”. Erdoğan described Togg as the “shared pride of Türkiye and 85 million people”. The businesses involved in Togg were declared “brave fellows”.

Even supporters of the opposition were in favour of Togg and criticised opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu for not showing enough support for such an important initiative.

Rallying nationalist support

It is no surprise that Erdoğan’s “great achievements” were at the centre of his election campaign. Just days before the first round, Erdoğan drove around in the first Togg car to get media coverage. He said the car “will hit the roads of Europe with all of its models” soon and the Europeans “will say ‘crazy Turks’ are coming”.

The government has created an understanding that every Turk must work “hard to elevate the country to the level of developed civilizations”. Low pay and insecure employment are the sacrifices workers must make for their country to reach this goal. Those who die in work accidents such as the mining disaster in Soma are called martyrs.

However, without being able to turn around the economy, Erdoğan’s projection of Turkish success and place in the world would seem to have been a winner.

Merve Sancak, Lecturer in Political Economy, Loughborough University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

( Middle East Monitor ) – The Turkish election scene is truly disgusting, a scene in which the Syrian refugees have become a scapegoat and the subject of fierce bidding by various parties. Recent days have witnessed a peak in this regard, reflecting the outcome of the first round of the presidential elections that took place in conjunction with the parliamentary elections on Sunday, 14 May. The current President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, received just under half of the votes, so a second round was required, while the opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, received about 45 per cent, and the fascist far-right candidate won about 5 per cent.

As a reminder, Erdogan is running in the elections on behalf of the Justice and Development Party that he founded and leads, and the People’s Alliance that combines his party with the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)  classified in the far right, as well as smaller groups, including the Free Cause Party, known in Turkiye as the “Turkish Hezbollah”. As for Kilicdaroglu, he is the leader of the Republican People’s Party, which is associated with the legacy of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish Republic, as well as with the international social democratic movement. He ran in the presidential elections on behalf of a coalition that includes six parties, known as the Table of Six and the Nation’s Alliance, which includes parties whose positions range from Kemalist (Good Party) to conservative Islamist (Felicity Party).

As for the third candidate, Sinan Ogan, he is a former member of the Nationalist Movement Party who ran in the first presidential election round under the banner of the Ancestral Alliance, which identifies with the fascist heritage. Similar to far-right groups everywhere, a major pillar of the Ancestral Alliance platform, as well as the Nationalist Movement Party, is hostility towards immigrants and refugees, which basically means hostility towards Syrian refugees, whose numbers reached over 3.5 million in Turkiye, out of the 5.5 million refugees who left Syria in the last ten years.

The top two candidates who remain in the running for the second round on Sunday, Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu, thought that gaining the support of the third candidate, Ogan, would lead those who voted for him in the first round to vote for them in the second round, meaning they would win the election. Intense efforts were made in this regard during the past week, as the two battling candidates competed to win the endorsement of the fascist alliance candidate.

Last Thursday, Kilicdaroglu delivered a speech immersed in opportunism in a miserable attempt to woo voters who voted for Ogan in the first round. He launched an attack on Erdogan, accusing him of flooding Turkiye with refugees, while exaggerating their number by claiming that it was 10 million, and promising to expel them from the country if he were to win the elections. Kilicdaroglu also blamed Erdogan for his negotiations with terrorists in the early years of his presidency, in reference to the PKK. This speech, which reflects Kilicdaroglu’s desperation to achieve his dream, is a losing bet, as he failed to woo the far right. Instead, he received great criticism from the left-wing opposition, whose votes he is counting on, including the Peoples’ Democratic Party, who are sympathetic towards the PKK.

On the other hand, Erdogan met with Ogan last Friday and, while what happened between the two in the meeting was not disclosed, it led to the Ancestral Alliance candidate announcing on Monday his endorsement of renewing the term of the current President. It is likely that the MHP circles played a role in urging Ogan to support Erdogan. The fact is that the latter, after losing the absolute majority in the 2015 parliamentary elections, made a sharp political turn and allied with the MHP, which has been sharing power with it since then, and this coincided with the re-ignition of the war with the PKK.

There has also been a gradual shift in the Turkish government’s rhetoric and practical measures, from welcoming the Syrian refugees to considering them a burden on the country that must be eliminated. Erdogan became determined to create a “Safe Zone” inside the Syrian territory in order to remove the refugees from Turkiye to it, while suggesting that forcibly returning refugees to eastern Syria would flood the areas with a concentrated Kurdish population with Arabs. However, this project has faced major obstacles, including American displeasure with it, and the Syrian regime’s rejection, supported by Russia and Iran. The Turkish government took the initiative to copy the Arab regimes, that it was in conflict with until recently, in their approach to reconcile with the rule of the Assad family, hoping to make a deal with the latter that would allow for the return of the majority of the refugees to the Syrian territories, which is also what the Lebanese and Jordanian rulers are seeking.

In any case, the far-right nationalist party has held the key to Turkish rule since 2015, i.e., since the Justice and Development Party needed it to secure a majority in the Turkish Parliament. This was further established in the 2018 elections, in which the party won a little less than half of the seats (295 out of 600). As for the last elections, the party won only 268 seats, and its nationalist ally won 50 seats, while the Nation Alliance won 212. This means that whoever wins the elections next Sunday, whether Erdogan (which is likely) or Kilicdaroglu, will be forced to rely on the Nationalist Movement Party to for a parliamentary majority, which confirms that the Syrian refugees will definitely be the scapegoat at the next stage.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor or Informed Comment.

Via Middle East Monitor

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