On Saturday, the US and Britain had flown a fourth round of bombings, directed at 18 Houthi military targets. The BBC says that they were directed at “storage facilities, drones, air defence systems, radars and a helicopter of the militant movement.”

A Houthi government spokesman downplayed the impact of the bombings and asserted that there was nothing the US could do about the movement’s Red Sea attacks.

If the US Air Force and the Royal Air Force commanders really think that a few bombing raids can knock out the Houthi capabilities, they haven’t been paying attention. The Saudis, the UAE and other members of a coalition bombed Yemen intensively from 2015 until 2021, as Sarah G. Phillips pointed out. At the end of the war the Houthis were still in control of 80% of the Yemeni population of some 33 million, who live on about a third of the land area of the country. They have certainly hidden away most of their munitions, having had to operate under aerial bombardment for almost a decade, and the targets being hit by the US and the UK are likely inconsequential.

Nationalist troops of the internationally recognized government of President Rashad al-Alimi have contained the Houthi forces to the south and the east but were never able to push them out of the most populous regions of the country in the north. I recently published a paper on how the United Arab Emirates worked with southern secessionists to establish control of the littoral of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden, but that is a thin sliver of southern territory.

[By the way, broadcast journalists, Houthi is pronounced like “who the” in English — Arabic has a “th” sound. I don’t know why the Americans keep saying Hootie.]

Reuters reports that about $1 trillion of goods is transported through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal annually, on some 19,000 vessels. That is about 30% of global seaborne trade, and it comes to about 12% of total world commerce. About 10% of global energy supplies go through this route.

Hindustan Times Video: “Red Sea On The Boil: American Ship Attacked; Houthis Reiterate Support To Palestinians | Watch”

The volume of goods transported through the Red Sea has fallen between 42% and 66% since the Houthis began attacking container ships. Many ships are going around the Cape of Good Hope and up the coast of West Africa, adding some 10 days to the journey from Asia to Europe, and upping the cost. Countries in the region have taken an economic hit. Egypt has suffered a 40% fall in Suez Canal revenues.

UNCTAD says that “Average container shipping spot rates from Shanghai in early February 2024 more than doubled – up by 122% compared to early December 2023. The rates from Shanghai to Europe more than tripled, jumping by 256%.”

China’s $1.8 billion in investments in Africa has also been placed in jeopardy, and the Chinese portion of Djibouti port has been idled.

The Israeli port of Eilat has apparently been idled, and occasionally has to fend off Houthi ballistic missiles. About 5% of Israel’s imports by sea used to come in through Eilat.

The easiest way to stop this economic disruption, which could have an impact on supply chains and prices that echoes the COVID-19 era of 2021-2023, is for President Biden to cut off arms and ammunition to the mad bomber, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Rising prices and supply chain problems would not be good for Biden’s reelection bid.

The Helpers of God militia is supported by many Yemenis of the Zaydi Shiite persuasion, a form of Shiite Islam that is closer to Sunnism and which does not have ayatollahs or some of the distinctive rituals of the Iranian and Iraqi Twelver Shiism. The militia’s leader is Abdul Malik al-Houthi, who announced this past week an escalation of attacks on Red Sea shipping.

Although the Houthis receive some money and arms from Iran, from all accounts it is a minor factor. They are an Arab, Yemeni movement with their own motivations and they have a weapons-making capacity of their own. The Helpers of God have become the de facto government of most people in Yemen and they tax them for revenue. It is not at all clear that an energy exporter like Iran would want Red Sea shipping disrupted.

The Nile is one of the world’s most famous rivers. It’s also Africa’s most important freshwater system. About 300 million people live in the 11 countries it flows through. Many rely on its waters for agriculture and fishing to make a living.

The Nile’s two main tributaries, the Blue Nile and the White Nile, come together in Sudan’s capital city, Khartoum. This industrial hub has grown rapidly over the past few decades.

The Nile is not immune to the same pollutants that affect rivers all over the world. Plastic debris is of particular concern. Over time plastics break down into smaller pieces known as microplastics. These are tiny plastic particles with a maximum size of five millimetres, all the way down to the nanoscale. Recent research found that

rivers are modelled to export up to 25,000 tons of plastics from their sub-basins to seas annually. Over 80% of this amount is microplastic.

This has huge negative consequences for biodiversity and the climate. As microplastics degrade, scientists have found, they produce greenhouse gases. Airborne microplastics may influence the climate by scattering and absorbing solar and terrestrial radiation, leading to atmospheric warming or cooling depending on particle size, shape and composition. It also negatively affects animal and human health. Microplastics have been shown in laboratory studies to be toxic to animals and cells.

Much of the research about microplastics in African waters has focused on marine and coastal areas. To address this gap, I conducted a study to assess the presence of microplastics in the River Nile in Khartoum. My students and I tested for the presence of microplastics in Nile tilapia. This popular African freshwater fish species forms the basis of commercial fisheries in many African countries, including Sudan.

Photo by Islam Hassan on Unsplash

The results do not make for happy reading. In the 30 freshly caught fish we surveyed, we found a total of 567 microplastic particles. This shows that the River Nile is contaminated with microplastics that can be consumed or absorbed in various ways by the tilapia and other aquatic organisms.

Our sample

The fish used in our study were caught just after the meeting point of the two Niles, known in Arabic as Al-Mogran.

We visited the Al-Mawrada fish market in the Omdurman area, which is also alongside the Nile. All 30 specimens we bought were freshly caught.

We dissected the fish to remove their digestive tracts. The individual tracts were treated so they would digest any organic matter they contained without interfering with the analysis of microplastics. The resulting solution was subject to another extraction procedure and we then conducted physical and chemical analyses.

Every specimen had microplastics in its digestive tract.

The number ranged from as few as five to as many as 47 particles per single fish. In total we identified 567 particles. This is high compared to studies that have reported microplastics in tilapia species in other rivers and lakes. There is, as yet, no global guideline or standard for what might be an “acceptable” number.

Shape, size and colour

We detected different sizes of microplastics (0.04mm to 4.94mm), shapes (fibres, fragments, films, foams and pellets) and colours. The most common were very small (less than 1mm), fibrous – they appear slender and elongated – and coloured (dyed).

These characteristics make sense because of how fish and other aquatic organisms feed. Nile tilapia are versatile feeders: they consume a variety of organisms including phytoplankton, aquatic plants, invertebrates, detritus, bacterial films, as well as other fish and fish eggs. That puts them at a high risk of ingesting microplastics.

Nile tilapia are also more likely to consume particles that are within a similar size range as their natural prey, as well as the same shape and colour.

Smaller microplastics are especially good carriers for other pollutants such as heavy metals, resulting in additional health risks. Their small size also makes it easier for them to move into organs like the liver. Studies have found microplastics in the tissues, muscles, livers, blubber and lungs of other aquatic as well as marine mammal species.

Fibres, the most dominant shape found in our specimens, stay in the intestine for longer than other microplastic shapes. This, too, can lead to health problems for the fish. Coloured microplastics contain dyes, many of which contain toxic chemicals.

This all has serious implications for human health, as people catch and eat the fish, which introduces those microplastics and associated chemicals into their bloodstreams.

Pollution sources

Where does all this plastic originate? For starters, 65% of plastic waste in Khartoum is disposed of in open dumps. From there, it contaminates water bodies and other parts of the environment.

Image by Refaat Naiem from Pixabay

The city’s wastewater treatment system is ineffective. The three wastewater treatment plants in Khartoum state, Karary, Wd-Daffiaa and Soba, are outdated and do not meet local and international standards. That means untreated effluent from domestic, industrial and agricultural activities is another probable source of microplastic pollution.

There are also countless recreational sites along the River Nile in Khartoum. The Nile Street is the most popular in the capital city, hosting water sports, restaurants, cafes, clubs, event venues and hotels, as well as the tea ladies (women who serve hot beverages from makeshift mobile cafes along the banks of the river). However, waste disposal and collection practices are sorely lacking, so plastic litter from these leisure activities leaks into the river.

No easy fix

Tackling microplastic pollution is not easy. It will require technological advances, as well as the collective efforts of consumers, producers, governments and the scientific community.

As consumers, we need to change our behaviour around plastic products, especially single-use plastics. For example, opt for fabric shopping bags instead of plastic bags; use glass and metal containers. Recycling is also important.

Governments must enforce waste management regulations and improve waste management practices, as well as helping to improve public awareness. Strategies and policies must explicitly feature microplastics.

Scientists can not only fill the knowledge gaps around microplastics. Communicating scientific findings is crucial; so too is developing innovations to protect against microplastics and their harmful effects.

I would like to thank and acknowledge my student Hadeel Alamin, who conducted this study with me.

Dalia Saad, Researcher, School of Chemistry, University of the Witwatersrand, University of the Witwatersrand

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The peace treaty has been the cornerstone of Egyptian-Israeli relations for nearly half a century.

The Egyptian government had not said much in public about these reports until yesterday. Mahmud `Abd al-Raziq of al-Khalij 35 reports reports that on Sunday, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued a stern warning to Israel that any operation in Rafah City would have “severe consequences.” The communique said that Egypt “continues its contacts and actions with various parties in order to arrive at an immediate ceasefire, enforce calm, and achieve an exchange of hostages and prisoners.” That is, Egypt is seeking another Israel-Hamas agreement, along with the US and Qatar.

Africanews Video: “Israel’s assault on Rafah endangers peace accords with Egypt, officials warn”

The ministry asked responsible international actors (we’re looking at you, Joe Biden) to pressure Israel not to do anything that would “complicate the situation further and cause harm to the interests of everyone without exception.”

Prominent Egyptian parliamentarian and journalist (he has a talk show!) Mustafa Bakri had openly said earlier that the Egyptian border is a “red line” and its breach would threaten the Camp David Accords.

In an interview with Sky News, the former deputy head of Egyptian military intelligence, Gen. Ahmad Ibrahim, had said that from his country’s point of view any Israeli take-over of the Philadelphi Corridor would constitute a breach of the Camp David Accords. He warned that Egypt’s military is “powerful.”

The Saudi foreign ministry also condemned the planned attack on Rafah City and any further coerced displacement of the Palestinians there. The Saudis called for an immediate ceasefire and a UN Security Council resolution against Netanyahu’s plan.

This position was echoed by the spokesman for the Gulf Cooperation Council, which rejected the Israeli plan to assault Rafah after forcibly expelling the civilian population.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Arab states called Friday for immediate, concrete and irreversible steps to recognize a Palestinian state.

It seems clear that even countries that are more or less at peace with Israel, whether formally (Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates) or informally (Saudi Arabia) have their hair on fire about the proposed Rafah operation.

Although American newspapers depict Egypt as broke, desperate and easily manipulated, my own estimation is that Cairo absolutely will not accept the Palestinians of Gaza as refugees on its soil. The Sinai is already a security problem for Cairo, and 2 million radicalized Palestinians would make it ungovernable. No amount of debt forgiveness would make such a bitter pill go down.

Munich (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – At the end of 2019, there was no shortage of articles looking retrospectively at the events that had shaped the decade of the 2010s. One of them was aptly titled “A decade of revolt.” From Tunis to New York, Madrid, Hong Kong, Tehran, or Khartoum, the past decade was marked by protests, demonstrations, and uprisings. If the notion that history is an almost continuous march towards the progress of human kind (a popular view among Western intellectuals in the 1990s such as Francis Fukuyama) still had some currency, the last decade should have put this idea to rest.

That is because, in hindsight, it is difficult to be optimistic about the results of this decade of revolt. This is a feeling shared by many and examined in the book “If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and the Missing Revolution.” The author, Vincent Bevins, is a US journalist who was highly praised for his previous book, “The Jakarta Method”, which discusses the US support for human rights abuses during the Cold War in the name of anti-Communism.

The question at the core of Bevins’ second book, “If We Burn”, is a very straightforward one: “How is it possible that so many mass protests led to the opposite of what they asked for?”[1] With the temporal focus set on the 2010s, but having a global geographical scope, Bevins conducted around 200 interviews in twelve different countries with activists, politicians, and other people with key insights on this decade of mass protests.

“If We Burn” discusses many different cases of protests during the last decade, but special attention is paid to Egypt, Hong Kong, Chile, and, above all, Brazil. This is no coincidence because, from 2010 to 2016, Bevins worked as a foreign correspondent based in São Paulo for the Los Angeles Times. The chapters on Brazil are a pleasure to read, but the strong focus on the country is somewhat disproportionate when considering that the book is presented as a work of global history. An alternative approach would have been to focus on a smaller number of cases, perhaps narrowing it down to a few Global South countries.

Bevins appears a bit uncomfortable when moving away from the countries he knows best. For instance, when he refers to the protests in Istanbul’s Taksim Square in 2013, Bevins writes that after coming to power in 2003, Turkey’s ruling party AKP embraced “more conservative Muslims and small business owners (as long as they were ethnic Turks).”[2] This is actually not the case, as the AKP has historically outperformed the main opposition party CHP – which has a much stronger Turkish nationalist discourse – in the Kurdish areas of Turkey.

Notwithstanding this inaccuracy, and the fact that the geographical scope of the book often works against the final result, there is much to be praised in “If We Burn.” A key success of the book is that Bevins strikes the perfect balance between critically examining what protests achieved in terms of tangible results and remaining deeply respectful of the protesters and their sacrifices. Tunisian President Kais Saied might have entrenched himself in power after 2021 and established a dictatorship similar to the one headed by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, brought down by mass demonstrations in 2011. But this does not take anything away from the personal stories of people like Jawaher Channa, a university student who joined the protests against Ben Ali in December 2010. Jawaher explains to Bevins how she was tortured for her political activity in a Tunisian police station before the regime collapsed.

Bevins’ reporting allows us to see how relatively unknown people shaped and were shaped by this decade of protests. Take the example of Mayara Vivian, who was a teenager when in 2005 she joined the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL) that demanded free transportation in Brazil. In 2013, Fernando Haddad, the mayor of São Paulo from the center-left Workers’ Party, announced a rise in the price of public urban transportation. Mayara and her colleagues at MPL mobilized the streets against Haddad’s decision, forcing the mayor to cancel the price increase. Mayara and other members of the MPL were even granted a meeting with then-Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, also from the Workers’ Party, who was trying to understand the growing discontentment with her government.

Vincent Bevins, If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and the Missing Revolution. Click here.

The likes of Mayara would soon be replaced in the streets by right and far-right-wing groups. These protesters, in conjunction with sympathetic judges like Sergio Moro and media conglomerates like Grupo Globo, pushed for Rousseff’s impeachment on flimsy charges. Rousseff was ousted in 2016. Two years later,  Fernando Haddad, the Workers’ Party candidate, was defeated in the presidential election by far-right and Brazilian dictatorship apologist Jair Bolsonaro. Mayara, then living in Santiago de Chile, wept while lamenting the election loss of the man she had opposed in the streets, explains Bevins.

Mayara soon joined the protests against the conservative Chilean President Sebastián Piñera, who was forced to accept the election of a constitutional assembly to reform the constitution inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship. After two referendums, Chile still does not have a new constitution. What is has, though, is Gabriel Boric as president, someone who became famous in the student protests of the early 2010s. Boric represents like no other the difficult relationship between activism and institutional politics, which is often manifested in the tensions between protesters who want to use their leverage to gain political concessions and those who prefer to keep pushing for maximalist objectives. A congressman since 2014, Boric was seen as a traitor by many protestors when he agreed to a constitutional referendum as a way to resolve the conflict with the Piñera government in 2019. After he was elected president of Chile in 2022, many of those who perceived Boric as too compromising in 2019 saw his decision in a more positive light, observes Bevins.

A key topic covered in “If We Burn” is the importance of traditional and social media in defining the protests of the last decade. Their relevance was accentuated by the fact that these were mostly de-centralized protest movements with no clear spokespersons. The protesters who had the opportunity to present their views to the traditional media were not necessarily those who put their bodies on the line when it mattered or were more representative of the whole movement. Instead, those who were interviewed were usually the more Western-media friendly. Writing about the protests in Egypt that led to the fall of dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011, Bevins graphically explains that despite how bravely street youth had fought against the police, Western journalists “were not likely to grab a teenager who lived on the street, addicted to drugs.”[3] Equally relevant was managing the narrative in social media platforms. In the case of the Occupy Wall Street movement, open fights emerged over who controlled the movement’s social media accounts.

“If We Burn” does not provide any conclusive answer on why so many protest movements failed to achieve their objectives during the 2010s, and this only makes the book better. Anyone claiming to have a perfect explanation for such a complex puzzle should be approached with caution. Still, Bevins presents reflections that help us make sense of what he calls ‘the mass protest decade.’ One of them is that horizontally structured, leaderless mass protests are “fundamentally illegible.”[4] As Bevins sees it, “movements that cannot speak for themselves will be spoken for”, with the ensuing danger that the protesters’ goals will be misrepresented. [5]

Strongly connected to this idea is the fact that successful protests will lead to a momentary political vacuum. Influenced by the experience of Brazil, where reactionary forces took the streets against Rousseff using some of the protest repertoire of the MPL movement advocating for free public transportation, Bevins notes that “unclaimed political power exerts an irresistible gravitational pull on anyone who might want it.”[6] Therefore, he argues, a protest movement that believes in creating a better society needs to be ready to enter the political vacuum that will emerge if successful.

In the absence of a plan, someone else will step in, most likely with a very different agenda but equally relying on the power of street mobilizations. The greatest merit of Bevins’ latest book is that it leaves a deep imprint on the reader and will serve as a prompt for many fruitful discussions. We cannot know which kind of retrospective articles will be published by the end of 2029. Still, it is reasonable to assume that protests in the 2020s are likely to play at least as important a role as they did in the previous decade.

[1] Vincent Bevins, “If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and the Missing Revolution” (New York: PublicAffairs, 2023), p. 3.

[2] Ibid., pp. 108-109.

[3] Ibid., p. 68.

[4] Ibid., p. 276.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., p. 263.

He also said that his government would not allow any American shipments to Yemen, and called on other Arab countries to boycott not only Israeli but also American trade in the region.

The Gaza conflict has several theaters. There is the Israeli war of genocide on the Palestinians of Gaza, which has killed over 18,000 people and wounded tens of thousands, the vast majority of them innocent noncombatants, and destroyed or damaged about half the region’s housing stock along with other essential infrastructure and buildings. It has also left the civilian population without sufficient food or water and exposed to deadly infectious diseases.

Then there is the tense Israeli-Lebanese border, where Israel has bombed from fighter jets and Hezbollah has fired rockets, necessitating the evacuation of some of northern Israel.

There have been Shiite militia attacks on US personnel in Syria and Iraq, with more threatened.

And then there is the really important Red Sea front, where the Houthi government has targeted commercial vessels it says are ferrying goods and supplies to Israel, though it seems also to be hitting just any old merchant ship. The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites and form part of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance to Israeli political dominance in the Levant and the occupation of the Palestinians. The Houthis survived an eight-year war with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, wealthy oil states allied with the United States that either recognize Israel (in the case of the UAE) or are considering it (the Saudis).

Yemen is a rugged country of impenetrable highlands and wildernesses. I’ve been there several times. The winding mountain roads outside Sanaa made me carsick. The Yemenis gave me khat for the nausea.

The country sits athwart the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the 20-mile-wide Bab al-Mandeb or Mandeb Straits through which traffic between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean passes. The UAE and its allies control the southern coast along the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, but the Houthis control some of the Red Sea coast and use their window on the sea to threaten shipping for their geopolitical purposes with drones, including Iran-made KAS-04 unmanned aerial vehicles. The Houthis have hit several container ships and a Norwegian oil tanker.

The Houthi government announced Saturday that it had launched a large number of drones toward the region of Eilat, Israel’s port city on the Gulf of Aqaba just off the Red Sea.

At the same time, the United States Central Command announced that its destroyers in the Red Sea had shot down 14 one-way attack drones.

The British Navy also weighed in, saying that a Sea Viper missile from the HMS Diamond had taken out a Houthi drone that threatened merchant shipping.

CBS News: “Houthis target ships in Red Sea, U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria face daily attacks”

As a result of the ongoing Houthi drone attacks on freighters, some of the world’s biggest and most important shipping corporations have announced that they will avoid the Red Sea and the Suez Canal for now. They are not only fleeing danger but also the dramatically spiking cost of insuring any vessels that ply those waters. The companies include Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), whose MSC PALATIUM III freighter was taken out of commission by a Houthi drone attack on Friday. They also include CMA CGM of France, Maersk of Denmark, and Hapag-Lloyd of Germany, according to the BBC.

Israeli shipping costs have shot up over 250%, and some insurers are refusing to insure their vessels.

The US plan to form a naval task force to escort container ships and protect them from the drones won’t work, because it won’t push down insurance costs. They could try to strike the Houthis, but 8 years of Saudi and UAE bombing of them did no good, so I wouldn’t hold my breath that lashing out would be effective. Moreover, the Biden administration doesn’t want the Gaza conflict to spread throughout the region and further destabilize it.

Some 10 percent of world trade goes through the Suez Canal on 17,000 ships a year. Nowadays, about 12% of the petroleum shipped by tanker goes through the Suez Canal, along with Liquefied Natural Gas shipments. These ships will now have to go around the Cape of Good Hope and skirt the west coast of Africa, adding over 10,000 nautical miles (over 12,000 landlubber miles) and 8 to 10 days to the journey, with all the consequent extra expenses of fuel and provisions. The shipping companies will be hurt by this change, as well as the countries along the Red Sea such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. The detour will contribute to supply chain shortages and cause an increase in the price of imported goods for many countries in Europe.

Maybe decades ago this statement had some truth to it, but it is outdated and irrelevant in today’s geopolitical climate. Israel is bookended by the two most powerful military states in the region, Egypt and Turkey, which are also many times more populous than the Jewish-majority state. Turkey, as a NATO member, has long had diplomatic relations with Israel, with which it does vigorous bilateral trade, including in weapons. Egypt has a peace treaty with Israel that has held since 1979, and the two countries engage in extensive military consultations. The Israeli campaign against Gaza since October 7 has done nothing to change all this.

Many Israelis believe that “ceding the Sinai was a mistake that will cost us dearly one day when Egyptian army divisions cross the Suez Canal into the Sinai and attack Israel”  The contrary is obviously true. By relinquishing its occupation of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and removing any sense of grievance toward Tel Aviv on the part of Cairo, Israel secured decades of peace on its western border.

Egypt, a military power ranked the 14^th strongest in the world, was on a war footing with the new neighboring country of Israel from 1948 through the mid-1970s. Yet, the relationship between the two military powers has been increasingly amicable in recent times due to many internal and external factors, including a common interest in quelling insurgencies in the strategic Sinai.

At the establishment of the Israeli state back in 1948, Egypt was one of the most vehement enemies of the newly founded nation, participating and often taking a leading role in the wars and skirmishes that unfolded in 1948, 1956, and 1967. However, by the late 1970s Egypt and Israel had begun to work on their relationship, especially through the Camp David Accords in 1978 that led to the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. Facilitated by former US president Jimmy Carter, this treaty established diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between the two states. 

Despite some fluctuations in the relationship between the two countries in the ensuing decades, the relationship became even more important with the rise of strongman Abdelfattah El-Sisi to power in 2014; His rise to power led to stronger ties to the Israeli state, given that both opposed the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoot, Hamas, as well as the ISIL terrorist organization.

Since the rise of the pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) from 2002, Israeli analysts have had some trepidation about Türkiye, a country that boasts a military power ranked at 11 in the world. Türkiye, long ruled by a militantly secular military junta, whether directly or behind the scenes, has increasingly made a place for Muslim devotion and a Muslim inflection of politics, though the secular constitution remains so far untouched. The long rule of Tayyip Erdogan, the country’s current president, has seen the AKP express support for Hamas and lambaste Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. In an article posted by The Jerusalem Post back in 2020, the newspaper’s editorial team claimed that Türkiye was a major threat to Israel and that any “Attempts to reconcile with Turkey have failed, and Ankara is now increasingly drunk on militarism and willingness to use force to get what it wants.”

In contrast to Egypt, Türkiye was one of the first nations with a Muslim majority to acknowledge the existence of the Israeli state and to establish diplomatic ties with the country. During Israel’s first two decades the two nations became strong allies and participated in military, economic, and financial collaborations.

The relationship between the two countries became strained in the late 2000s because of two incidents. In late 2008 Israel attacked on Gaza bwithout informing Türkiye beforehand. Then, even more seriously, in 2010 Israeli commandos attacked the Turkish humanitarian ship Mavi Marmara that was headed to Gaza, resulting in the deaths of 9 Turks and 1 Turkish-American.

Still, starting in 2020, the relationship between the two nations was on a corrective path with Israel President Herzog visiting Ankara in 2022 to discuss Energy deals between the two and to encourage stronger economic and trade ties.

The New Africa Channel: “Egyptian President Al Sisi says Palestine must be recognized as a state to end Israel Gaza war ”

Post-October 7^th, the relationship between these two regional powers and Israel saw, understandably, a shift in tone. Yet, it’s not a shift that endangers Israeli policy, much less Israeli’s existence. Both Türkiye and Egypt along with most Arab states and many countries of the global South have condemned Israel’s response to the Hamas-led attacks, which has resulted in over 15.000 deaths in the Strip. None of these countries, however, have shown any interest in military interference, or a hostile approach. 

From Egypt’s perspective, ties with with Israel are largely undisturbed. The main tension has arisen over Israel’s pressuring of Egypt to open its border with Gaza at Rafah and to accept large numbers of Palestinian refugees. According to Egypt, such massive Palestinian displacement is a contravention of humanitarian law. Cairo is afraid, more importantly, that such a huge refugee population would endanger Egypt’s already struggling economy and would cause some serious threats to the country’s security.

Hence, Egypt’s stance on the issue had nothing to do with hostility toward Israel, but was defensive in nature, showing a profound concern about policies that threatened to harm its security.

In Türkiye’s case, after the October 7^th attacks the country was ready to help mediate the situation. In an effort to take the first step, Erdogan decided to ask Hamas’ political wing, who were in his country at that moment, to leave. However, the tone of Turkiye’s stance slowly began to change as Israel inflicted more and more casualties on the Palestinians of Gaza, to the extent that Erdogan began branding the campaign a genocide.

Erdogan expressed himself more and more virulently toward Israel’s conduct of the war. In one post, Erdogan pledged that “As Türkiye, we will continue to work for a humanitarian ceasefire and then for the establishment of lasting stability.” Yet shortly thereafter, in his speech at the COP28 UN climate summit in Dubai, Erdogan called Israel’s actions “ war crimes.”  In a recent speech he branded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “the Butcher of Gaza” and predicted he would be tried in the Hague, as Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic was. Despite Erdogan’s vehement rhetoric, however, trade with Israel continues unimpeded, even trade in weaponry.

To conclude, despite a checkered relationship between Israel and the two regional powers of Turkey and Egypt, Israel’s claim that it is pitted in the Middle East alone against a swarm of enemies is unfounded and misleading. While enemies of the Israeli state unmistakably exist, opposition to Israeli policies and their mistreatment of Palestinians does not equate to a call for Israel’s destruction. The change in both Türkiye and Egypt’s rhetoric toward Israel constitutes a critique of in Israel’s policies. The biggest and best-armed countries in the region other than Israel itself have remained uneasy economic and security partners for Tel Aviv throughout this crisis.

StayTunedNBC: “Juan Cole on Ridley Scott’s depiction of Napoleon in Egypt”

I wrote a book about Bonaparte in Egypt for those of you who want to know more about the first major Western colonial war in the Middle East:

Juan Cole. Napoleon’s Egypt. Click here.

[Those who donate $100 to our annual fundraiser at IC will get a signed copy of Napoleon’s Egypt:

Personal checks should be made out to Juan Cole and sent to me at:

Juan Cole
P. O. Box 4218,
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2548
USA
(Remember, make the checks out to “Juan Cole” or they can’t be cashed) ]

Here is an account of the invasion by eyewitness Pierre François Xavier Boyer, an aide to Bonaparte, translated by the British, who intercepted it and other correspondence between Cairo and Paris.

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 147-162.

TRANSLATION.

Grand Cairo, July 28th.

My dear Parents,

OUR entrance into this city furnishes me with an opportunity of writing to you(1); and as my design is to make you fully acquainted with an expedition no less singular than astonishing, I shall take the liberty of recapitulating our achievements since the day we left Toulon.

The land army, composed of 30,000 men, embarked at Marseilles, Toulon, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia, set sail on the 19th of May, under the convoy of 15 sail of the line (two of which were armed en flute[2]) 14 frigates, and several smaller ships of war. The convoy altogether formed a total of more than 400 sail; and never perhaps, since the Crusades, has so large an armament appeared in the Mediterranean.

Without calculating the dangers of the element on which we were embarked, or those which we had to apprehend from an enemy formidable at sea, we steered with a favourable wind for Malta, where we arrived on the 10th of June. The conquest of this important place cost us but a few men. It capitulated on the 12th—the Order was abolished, and the Grand Master packed off to Germany with a budget of fine promises; in a word, every thing succeeded to our wish. Time, however, was precious—we had no leisure to amuse ourselves with calculating the advantages to be derived from the possession of Malta; for an English squadron of 13 sail of the line, commanded by Nelson, was at anchor in the Bay of Naples(3), and watched all our motions. Bonaparte, informed of this, scarce gave us time to take in water: he ordered the fleet to weight immediately, and, on the 18th of June, we were already in full sail for the second object of our expedition. We fell in with Candia on the 25th, and on the 30th our light vessels made Alexandria.

Admiral Nelson had been off the city on the noon of this very day; and proposed to the Turks to anchor in the port, by way of securing it against us; but as his proposal was not accepted, he stood on for Cyprus; while we, profiting by his errors, and turning even his stupidity to our own advantage, made good our landing on the 2d of July, at Marabou. The whole army was on shore by break of day, and Bonaparte putting himself at their head, marched straight to Alexandria, across a desert of three leagues, which did not even afford a drop of water, in a climate where the heat is insupportable.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, we reached the town, which was defended by a garrison of near 500 Janizaries. Of the rest of the inhabitants, some had thrown themselves into the forts, and others got on the tops of their houses. In this situation they waited our attack. The charge is sounded—our soldiers fly to the ramparts, which they scale, in spite of the obstinate defence of the besieged: many Generals are wounded, amongst the rest Kleber—we lose near 150 men, but courage, at length, subdues the obstinacy of the Turks! Repulsed on every side, they betake themselves to God and their Prophet, and fill their mosques—men, women, old, young, children at the breast, ALL are massacred(4). At the end of four hours, the fury of our troops ceases—tranquility revives in the city—several forts capitulate—I myself reduce one into which 700 Turks had fled—confidence springs up—and, by the next day, all is quiet.

It will not be amiss, I think, to make a short digression just here—for the sake of informing you of the object of this expedition, and of the causes which have induced Bonaparte to take possession of Egypt.

France, by the different events of the war and the Revolution, having lost her colonies and her factories, must inevitably see her commerce decline, and her industrious inhabitants compelled to procure at second hand the most essential articles of their trade. Many weighty reasons must compel her to look upon the recovery of those colonies, if not impossible, yet altogether unlikely to produce any of the advantages which were derived from them before they became a scene of devastation and horror; especially, if we may add to this, the decree for abolishing the slave trade.

To indemnify itself, therefore, for this loss, which may be considered as realized, the Government turned its views towards Egypt and Syria; countries which, by their climate and their fertility, are capable of being made the storehouses of France, and, in process of time, the mart of her commerce with India. It is certain, that by seizing and organizing these countries, we shall be enabled to extend our views still further; to annihilate, by degrees, the English East India trade, enter into it with advantage ourselves; and, finally, get into our hands the whole commerce of Africa and of Asia.

These, I think, are the considerations which have induced the Government to undertake the present expedition against Egypt.

This part of the Ottoman dominion has been for many ages governed by a species of men called Mameloucs, who, having a number of Beys at their head, disavow the authority of the Grand Seignior, and rule despotically and tyrannically, a people and a country, which, in the hands of a civilized nation, would become a mine of wealth.

To gain possession of Egypt, then, it is necessary to subdue these Mameloucs(5); they are in number about 8000—al cavalry—under the command of 24 Beys. It is of consequence to give you some idea of these people, their manner of making war, their arms, defensive and offensive, and their origin.

Every Mamelouc is purchased—they are all from Georgia and Mount Caucasus—there are a great number of Germans and Russians amongst them, and even some French. Their religion is Mahometanism: exercised from their infancy in the military art, they acquire an extraordinary degree of dexterity in the management of their horses, in shooting with the carabine and pistol, in throwing the lance, and in wielding the sabre; there have been instances of their severing, at one blow, a head of wet cotton.

Every Mamelouc has two, three, and sometimes four servants, who follow him on foot wherever he goes; nay, even to the field. The arms of a Mamelouc on horseback, are two carabines, carried by his servants—these are never fired but once—two pair of pistols stuck in his girdle; eight light lances in a kind of quiver, which he flings with admirable dexterity; and an iron headed mace. When all these are discharged, he comes to his last resource—his two sabers: putting, then, the bridle of his horse between his teeth, he takes one of them in each hand, and rushes full speed upon the foe, cutting and slashing to right and left. Woe be to those who cannot parry his blows! For some of them have been known to cleave a man down the middle. Such are the people with whom we are at war! I shall now proceed with my narrative.

Having organized a government at Alexandria, and secured a communication(6) with the read of our army, Bonaparte ordered every man to furnish himself with five day’s provisions, and made preparations for passing a desert of twenty leagues in extent, in order to arrive at the mouth of the Nile, and ascend that celebrated stream to Grand Cairo—the prime object of his expedition. We began our march on the 5th of July, and reached the river by easy stages, falling in, on our route, with some detached parties of the Mameloucs, who retired as we advanced. It was not till the 12th, that General Bonaparte learned that the Beys were marching to meet him, with their united forces, and that he might expect to be attacked the next day: he marched therefore in order of battle, and took the necessary precautions.

Bonaparte sent me forward to gain intelligence, with three armed sloops; with this little flotilla I advanced about three leagues in front of the army. I landed at every village on both sides of the Nile, to gain what information I could respecting the Mameloucs; in some I was fired at, in others received with kindness, and offered provisions. In one of them I met with an adventure as laughable(7) as it is singular: the Cheik of the place having collected all his people to meet me, came forward from the rest, and demanded to know by what right the Christians were come to seize a country which belonged to the Grand Seignior. I answered him, that it was the will of God and his Prophet to bring us there. But, rejoined he, the King of France ought at least to have informed the Sultan of this step. I assured him that this had been done; and he then asked me how our King did? I replied, very well; upon which he swore by his turban and his beard, that he would always look on me as his friend. I took advantage of the kindness of these good people, collected all the information I could, and continuing my route up the Nile, came to anchor for the night opposite a village called Chebriki, where the Mameloucs were collected in force, and where the first action took place.

I sent off my dispatches to the Commander in Chief that night; in these I gave him all the information I had been able to obtain respecting the Mameloucs.

As soon as the day broke, I clambered up the mast of my vessel, and discovered six Turkish shalops bearing down upon me; at the same time I was reinforced by a demi-galley. I drew out my little fleet to meet them, and at half after four a cannonade began between us, which lasted five hours; in spite of the enemy’s superiority, I made head against them, they continued nevertheless to advance upon me, and I lost for a moment the demi-galley, and one of the gun-boats. Yielding, however, was out of the question, it was absolutely necessary to conquer;–in this dreadful moment our army came up, and I was disengaged. One of the enemy’s vessels blew up. Such was the termination of our naval combat.

While this was passing, the Mameloucs advanced upon our army; they rode round and round it, without finding any point where an impression might be made, and, indeed, without any attempt at it. I presume, that, astonished at the manner in which our columns were drawn up, they were induced to put off to a future day the decision of their fortune and their empire. This affair was trifling enough in itself, the Mameloucs only lost about 20 men, but we reaped a considerable advantage from it, that of having given an extraordinary idea of our tactics to an enemy acquainted with any; who knows of no other superiority in arms than that of sleight and agility; without order to firmness, unable even to march in platoons, advancing in confused groups, and falling upon the enemy in sudden starts of wild and savage fury.

After the retreat of the Mameloucs, we advanced upon Cairo, where the decisive action took place. It was, in fine, on the 22d of July, that the army found itself at daybreak about three leagues from Cairo, and give from the so much celebrated Pyramids. Here the Mameloucs, commanded by the famous Mourad, the most powerful of the Beys, awaited us: till three in the afternoon the day was wasted in skirmishes; at length the hour arrived! Our army, flanked on the right by the Pyramids, and on the left by the Nile, perceived the enemy was making a movement. Two thousand Mameloucs advanced against our right, commanded by General Desaix and Regnier. Never did I see so furious a charge! Giving their horse the rein, they rushed on the divisions like a torrent, and pushed in between them. Our soldiers, firm and immoveable, let them come within ten paces, and then began a running fire, accompanied with some discharges of artillery; in the twinkling of an eye more than 150 of them fell, the rest sought their safety in flight. They returned, however, to the charge, and were received in the same manner. Wearied out at length by our resistance, they turned, and attacked out left wing, to see if fortune would there be more favorable to them.

The success of our right encouraged Bonaparte. The Mameloucs had thrown up a hasty entrenchment in the village of Embabet, on the left bank of the Nile, in which they had placed thirty pieces of cannon, with their valets, and a small number of Janizaries to defend their approaches—this entrenchment the General gave orders to force; two divisions undertook it, in spite of a terrible cannonade. At the instant our soldiers were rapidly advancing towards it, six hundred Mameloucs sallied from the works, surrounded our platoons, and endeavoured to cut them down;–but, instead of succeeding, met their own deaths. Three hundred of them dropt on the spot; and the rest, in their attempt to escape, threw themselves into the Nile, where they all perished. Despairing now of any success, the Mameloucs fled on all sides; set fire to their fleet, which soon after blew up, and abandoned their camp to us, with more than four hundred camels loaded with baggage.

Thus ended the day, to the confusion of an enemy who were possessed with the belief that they should cut us in pieces; and who had boasted that it was as easy to cut off the heads of a thousand Frenchmen, as to divide a gourd or a melon(8).

The army marched on that night to Gizeh; the residence of Murat, the Chief of the Mameloucs. The next day we crossed the Nile in flat-bottomed boats, and entered Cairo without resistance.

Here ends the narrative of our military operations. I propose now to give you some account of the miseries we underwent in our march, together with a brief description of the country we have traversed, and of the inhabitants.

Let us return to Alexandria.—This city has nothing of its antiquity but the name—if there be any other relicks(9) of it, they remain utterly unregarded and unknown, among a people, who appear to be scarce conscious of their own existence. Figure to yourself being incapable of feeling, taking events just as they occur, and surprised at nothing; who with a pipe in his mouth, has no other occupation than that of squatting on his breech before his own door, or that of some great man, and dreaming away the day, without a thought of his wife or family. Figure to yourself too, a number of mothers strolling about, wrapped up in a dirty black rage, and offering to sell their children to every one they meet;–Men half naked, of the colour of copper, and of a most disgusting appearance, raking in the puddles and kennels like hogs, and devouring every thing they find there;–houses of twenty feet in height at the most, of which the roof is flat, the interior a stable, and the exterior four mud walls.—Figure to yourself all this, I day,and you will have a pretty correct idea of the city of Alexandria. Add, that around this mass of misery and horror, lie the ruins of the most celebrated city of the ancient world, the most precious monuments of the arts.

Leaving this city to ascend the Nile, you cross a desert, bare as my hand, where every three or four leagues you find a paltry well of brackish water. Imagine yourself the situation of an army obliged to pass these arid plains, which do not afford the slightest shelter against the intolerable heat which prevails there! The soldier, loaded with provisions, finds himself, before he has marched an hour, overcome by the heat, and the weight of what he carries, and throws away every thing that adds to his fatigue, without thinking of tomorrow. Thirst attacks him! He has not a drop of water; hunger!—he has not a bit of bread. It was thus that amidst the horrors which this faithful picture presents, we beheld several of the soldiers die of thirst, of hunger, and of heat; others, seeing the sufferings of their comrades, blew out their own brains; others threw themselves, loaded as they were, into the Nile, and perished in the water.

Every day of our march renewed these dreadful scenes; and, what was never heard of before—what will stagger all belief; the army, during a march of seventeen days, never tasted bread—the soldiers lived during the whole of this time on gourds, melons, poultry, and such vegetables as they found on their route. Such as the food of all, from the General to the common soldier,–nay, the General was often obliged to fast for eighteen to twenty hours, because the privates generally arriving first, plundered the villages of every article of subsistence, and frequently reduced him to the necessity of satisfying himself with the refuse of their hunger, or of their imtemperance!

It is useless to speak of our drink. We all live here under the law of Mahomet, which forbids the use of wine; but, by way of indemnity, allows us as much Nile water as we can drink.

Shall I give you some account of the country between the two branches of the Nile? To do this properly, I must lay before you a topographical chart of the course and direction of the river.

Two leagues below Cairo it divides itself into two branches; one of which falls into sea at Rosetta; the other at Damietta: the intermediate country is called the Delta, and is extremely fertile. Along the outer sides of the two branches, runs a slip of cultivated land, broader in some places than in others, but no where more than a league: beyond this are the Deserts, extending on the left to Lybia, and on the right to the Red Sea. From Rosetta to Cairo, the country is well peopled, and produces a good deal of wheat, rice, lentils &c. The villages are crowded together-their construction is execrable, being little more than heaps of mud trodden into some consistency, hollowed out within; and resembling, in every feature, the snow heaps of our children. If you recollect the shape of those oven-like piles, you have a perfect idea of the palaces of the Egyptians!

The husbandmen, commonly called Fellas, are extremely laborious; they live on little, and in a state of filth and degradation that excites horror. I have seen them swallow the residue of the water which my camels and horses happened to leave in their troughs.

Such is this Egypt, so celebrated by travelers and historians! In despite, however, of all these horrors, of the hardships we endure, and of the miseries the army is condemned to suffer, I am still inclined to think that it is a country calculated above all others to give us a colony which may be productive of the highest advantages(10); but for this, time and hands are necessary. I have seen enough to be convinced, that it is not with soldiers as ours! They are terrible in the field, terrible after victory(11), and, without contradiction, the most intrepid troops in the world: but they are not formed for distant expeditions. A word dropt at random, will dishearten them—they are lazy, capricious, and exceedingly turbulent and licentious in their conversation—they have been heard to say, as their officers passed by, “there go the Jack Ketches of the French!” and a thousand other things of the same kind.

The cup of bitterness is poured out, and I will drain it to the dregs. I have on my side firmness, health, and a spirit which I trust will never flag: with these I will persevere to the end.

I have yet said nothing of Grand Cairo. This city, the capital of a kingdom, which, to borrow the language of the Savans of the country, has no bounds, contains about 400,000 souls. Its form is that of a long shaft or tunnel, crowded with houses piled one upon another, without order, distribution, or method of any kind. Its inhabitants, like those of Alexandria, are plunged in the most brutal ignorance, and regard with astonishment the prodigy who is able to read and write! This city, however, such as I have described it, is the centre of a considerable commerce, and the spot where the caravans of Mecca and India terminate their respective journies (My next will give you some account of these caravans).

I went yesterday to see the installation of the Divan, which Bonaparte has formed. It consists of nine persons(12). And such a sight! I was introduced to nine bearded automatons, dressed in long robes, and turbans; and whose mien and appearance altogether, put me strongly in mind of the figures of the twelve apostles in my grandfather’s little cabinet. I shall say nothing to you of their talents, knowledge, genius, wit, &c.—this is always a blank chapter in Turkey. No where is there to be found such a deplorable ignorance as in every part of that country—no where such wealth, and no where so vile and sordid is a misuse of the blessing.

Enough of this. I have now, I think, fulfilled my intentions: many topics have been doubtless overlooked; but these deficiencies will be well supplied by the dispatches of General Bonaparte.

Do not entertain any uneasiness on my account. I suffer, it is true, but the whole army suffers with me. My baggage has reached me in safety; I have, therefore, in the general distress, all the advantages of fortune. Once again, be easy; I am in good health.

Take care of your healths; in less than a year I hope to have the happiness of embracing you. I know how to appreciate that happiness in advance, as I will one day shew you.

I embrace my sisters with the sincerest affection, and am with respect,

Your most obedient son,

BOYER.

I thought I would share this account, given that Ridley Scott’s film Napoleon, is being released this weekend and readers may be interested in this little-known episode. Bonaparte took Egypt in the summer of 1798, likely in an attempt to grab its grain and other exports for Revolutionary France and possibly also to cut Britain off from its Indian colony. The British, however, sank the French fleet soon after it cast anchor off the coast of Alexandria. Bonaparte and the French army were conquerors of Egypt but were also stranded there.

The following spring, General Bonaparte marched into Ottoman Palestine, then under the rule of an Ottoman vassal Cezzar Pasha. The British navy, however, intercepted the heavy artillery that had to be sent by sea from Alexandria to the Palestinian coast. The French could take overland only light artillery. They besieged Cezzar’s capital of Akka March through May but could not breach the fortified city walls. They then retreated, as described by Berthier. His letter was intercepted by the British along with a good deal of other French correspondence, and the British gleefully translated these letters and published them the following year in London.

I wrote a book about Bonaparte in Egypt for those of you who want to know more about the first major Western colonial war in the Middle East:

Juan Cole. Napoleon’s Egypt. Click here.

[Those who donate $100 to our annual fundraiser at IC will get a signed copy of Napoleon’s Egypt:

Personal checks should be made out to Juan Cole and sent to me at:

Juan Cole
P. O. Box 4218,
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2548
USA
(Remember, make the checks out to “Juan Cole” or they can’t be cashed) ]

Now, on to Berthier:

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 33-36.

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

Prairial 1.—The enemy, who had been bombarded and cannonaded by a very severe fire, and who saw the destruction of the palace of Dgezzar [Ottoman vassal ruler Jazzar, Cezzar Pasha], of that part of their fortifications which had not yet been attacked, and of all the public edifices, attempted another sortie at the 1st Prarial, at day break; they were again repulsed.

Although the French army could not breach the city walls, they could bombard it with artillery. They fired shells at the palace of Cezzar Pasha and at civilian buildings, wreaking great destruction on habitations.

At three in the afternoon they rushed forward, and attacked every point. They availed themselves of the reinforcements they had received, and their object was to throw themselves into our batteries. This attack was made with more than their usual ferocity; they were, however, repulsed on all sides, except at the turn of the glacis, near the breach tower, of which they took possession; but it was soon retaken by General Lagrange, who attacked the enemy with two companies of grenadiers, and even pursued them into their external armed post, of which he made himself master, and compelled the enemy to retire into the place.—The enemy, in that reconnoiter, lost a considerable number of their bravest troops.

Bonaparte reluctantly gave up on taking Akka at that point and gave the order to retreat back to Egypt.

The whole of the siege artillery was now removed. It was replaced in the batteries by some field piece. What was useful was thrown into the sea. By means of a mine, and sapping, we destroyed an aqueduct of several leagues in length, with which Acre was supplied with fresh water; all the magazines and the harvest in the environs of Acre were reduced to ashes.

In a scorched earth policy, on their way out the French attempted to deprive the people of Akka of potable water by blowing up an aqueduct. This was sheer colonial spite, since it was not done in hopes of taking the city. That goal had already been given up on. It was just a goodbye “screw you!” from a disappointed would-be colonizer. – JRIC

At nine in the evening of the 1st Prairial, the drums were beat to march, and the siege, which lasted sixty-one days after the opening of the trenches, was raised. When they had passed the bridge, the division of Kleber began likewise to move. It was followed by the cavalry, who left 100 dragoons dismounted to protect the workmen employed in destroying the two bridges. They had orders not to quit the banks of the river till two hours after the last of the infantry had crossed. General Junot, with his corps, had proceeded to the mill of Kerdanna, to cover the left wing of the army.

The enemy continued to fire upon our parallels during the whole night, and did not perceive till next day that the siege was raised. They had suffered so much, that they did not attempt any movement to follow us.

The army conducted the march with the greatest order. On the 2d we arrived at Cantoura, a port which had been our landing place for the articles coming from Damietta to Jaffa, and where it had been landing our besieging artillery, and the Turkish field pieces taken at Jaffa. This artillery, consisting of forty pieces, had been, from time to time, carried to the camp of Acre, to supply the place of the French field-pieces which we were obliged to employ as battering pieces in the siege. Bonaparte had not horses sufficient to draw this immense quantity of Turkish artillery. He preferred the mode of carrying off by sea to Jaffa his sick and wounded. He resolved to carry off only twenty Turkish pieces. He caused twenty to be thrown into the sea, and burnt the carriages and cases on the harbor of Cantoura.

On the 3rd the army slept upon the ruins of Cesarea. The following day several Naplousians [fighters from Nablus] appeared at the port of Abouzaboura. Some of them were taken and shot; the rest retired. Their purpose was to plunder the stragglers who are to be found about an army.

On the 4th the army encamped four leagues from Jaffa, up on a river which formed a kind of creek. Detachments were sent to burn the villages which had sent parties to harass our convoys during the siege. The grain was burnt, and the cattle carried off.

The French, of course, could not know from which villages the fighters came that harried them as they retreated. They likely burned villages indiscriminately and stole their cattle, in a bid to frighten others into leaving them alone as they withdrew.

On the 5th the army arrived at Jaffa. A bridge of boats had been thrown over the little river of Bahahia, which is with difficulty passed at a ford along the bar, formed at the place where it falls into the sea. On the 6th, 7th, and 8th, the army stopped at Jaffa. This interval was employed in punishing the villages which had conducted themselves improperly. The corn, as well as the cattle, was carried off. The fortifications of Jaffa were blown up. The merchants of Jaffa paid a contribution of 150,000 livres.

Even as they were leaving, the French plundered villages for corn and cattle, damaged the fortifications of the city of Jaffa that protected it from rural raiders, and shook down the merchants of Jaffa for a large sum of money. The annual income of a well-off noble family just before the revolution was 150,000 livres. Bonaparte was famed for making the people he conquered pay for the conquest, but here he made the people who had resisted him successfully pay for his defeat.

General Dugua wrote to Bonaparte from Egypt, informing him that symptoms of revolt had manifested themselves in the provinces of Benisness [Beni Suef?], Carkie [Sharqiyyah], and especially in that of Bahire [Beheira]; that the English had made their appearance at Suez: that the Mamelukes who were driven from Upper Egypt, and who had descended into the provinces of Lower Egypt, made several attempts to stimulate the people to insurrection; but every thing was quieted by the activity of the troops; and the vigilant conduct of the generals, but that the city of Cairo, and the other principal cities of Egypt, had remained in the most perfect tranquility.

These insurrections were a ramification of the plan of a general attack, which was to have been made upon the French in Egypt, and that at the time Dgezzar was to go into Syria, and when the Anglo-Turkish fleet was to present itself before Damietta.

The army set out on the 9th; Regnier’s division forming the left column, marching by Ramie, with orders to burn the villages, and destroy all the harvest. The head quarters, the division of Bon, and that of Lannes, took the central road, and likewise burnt the villages and the corn harvest. A column of cavalry was detached to the right along the coast. They scoured the downs, and drove in all the cattle that had there been collected.

The French appear to have wrought widespread devastation as they retreated, torching fields and villages and leaving people to starve without shelter. They confiscated all the cattle they could find, turning themselves into a sort of weird French cowboys and cattle rustlers in Palestine.

Kleber’s division formed the rear guard, and had orders not to quit Jaffa until the 10th. In this order the army marched as far as Jounisse; that immense plain presented but one blaze of fire; so dreadful was the vengeance inflicted for the assassinations committed on our troops, and for the very frequent attacks on our convoys, while this severe measure, rendered necessary by the laws of war, deprived the enemy of all means of furnishing magazines and securing provisions.

Although Bertier attempted to excuse these atrocities, which turned the fertile plains of Ottoman Palestine into enormous conflagrations that appear to have encompassed entire groups of villages, even in the eighteenth century this behavior was considered outrageous.

The army encamped on the 10th at Mecheltal, and arrived on the 11th at Gaza, form which it moved again on the 12th. That city had conducted itself very peaceably: it was therefore entitled to protection of persons and property. The fortress was blown up, and three of the rich inhabitants, whose conduct had been very hostile, we taxed with a contribution of one hundred thousand livres.

Ironically, the French generally spared Gaza the sort of vengeful devastation they wrought elsewhere in Palestine. But even there they blew up the city’s fortress, leaving it defenseless before bedouin raids, and they shook down three large merchants for enough money to keep an Ancien Regime noble family in style for a whole year.

Kleber’s division continued a day’s march behind. The army arrived at Kan-Jounesse on the 12th, and again pursued their march on the 13th. They entered the Desert, followed by an immense quantity of cattle which they had taken from the enemy, and with which they intended to provision El-arisch. The desert between this place and Kan-Jounesse comprises a space of eleven leagues, inhabited by the Arabs, who had frequently attacked our convoys. We burnt several of their camps; we carried away a great number of their cattle and camels, and set fire to a small harvest that was collected in some parts of the desert.

Sony Pictures Entertainment: “NAPOLEON – Official Trailer (HD)”

On the 14th, the army stopped for the day at El-Arisch. Bonaparte there left a garrison. He ordered new works to be constructed for the defense of the fort. He caused it to be supplied with stores and provisions. The army continued its march to Cathich, where it arrived on the 19th. The divisions, although marching successively, sustained great inconvenience from want of water. The desert is 22 leagues in extent, in which there is no supply to be had, except about half way, where there is a bad well of brackish water.

On the 18th the army continued its march. The head quarters were removed on the 19th, in order to proceed to Salchich. The division of Kleber marched to Tiach, to embark for Damietta.—The rest of the army was collected at Cathich, where it remained for some time, and then proceeded to Cairo, where it arrived on the 26th. The natives were astonished to see the army in the same state as it just came out of barracks. The soldiers considered themselves as it were in their native country in returning to Cairo, and the inhabitants received us as their compatriots.

The army engaged in the Syrian Expedition, in four months lost about 700 men by disease, 500 killed in battle, and about 1000 wounded, 90 of whom underwent amputation, and were rendered incapable of serving but in the invalids. Almost all the other wounded men are cured, and have joined their corps.

(Signed)

Alexander Berthier.

General of Division, Chief of Staff.

Cairo, 6 Messidor, Year 7.

Egypt and Ethiopia have waged a diplomatic war of words over Ethiopia’s massive new dam – the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – on the Blue Nile, which started filling up in July 2020. The political row has threatened to get out of hand on occasion but now the two countries have finally agreed to conclude “a mutually acceptable agreement” within four months. We asked John Mukum Mbaku, the author of a recent article on the Ethiopian dam and a co-author of a book on the Nile River’s changing legal regime, to answer four key questions.

What is the context of the current tussle?

Ethiopia, whose highlands provide more than 85% of the water that flows into the Nile, has long argued that it has the right under international law to manage resources within its own borders for its national development. It sees the “Nile as a gift of God” given to Ethiopians to use for their development.

Egypt, which depends on the Nile for more than 90% of its fresh water, has argued that the Ethiopian dam represents a threat to its water security and its very existence as a people.

The decision by Addis Ababa to begin construction of the dam on the Blue Nile in 2011 exacerbated an already deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and its two downstream neighbours, Egypt and Sudan, over access to Nile waters. After Egypt’s diplomatic efforts failed to stop construction, Cairo redirected its energies to securing a legally binding agreement for filling and operating the dam.

But no mutually acceptable agreement for filling and operating the dam was ever reached.

In August 2020, Addis Ababa began to fill the dam’s reservoir. That process was repeated in 2021 and 2022.

In 2023, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed announced that the country would delay the fourth filling until September “to alleviate the concerns of neighbouring people”.

The dam’s reservoir filling in particular, and its operation in general, are issues that the three countries must resolve, most likely through a legally binding agreement or treaty.

In February 2022, the Ethiopian dam started producing electricity. Egyptians claimed that Addis Ababa was “violating its obligations under the 2015 Declaration of Principles” and endangering Egyptian “water interests”.

What are the main sticking points going into the talks?

An agreement would have to explicitly deal with issues that are important to Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The most important are Egypt’s and Sudan’s historically acquired rights to Nile waters. The rights were granted by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan (1959 Nile Treaty).

After estimating the average annual flow of the Nile River as measured at Aswan to be 84 billion cubic metres, the two treaties granted 66% of Nile waters to Egypt, 22% to Sudan and 12% to account for seepage and evaporation. These allocations exhausted all the Nile’s average annual flow of water. Egypt was also granted veto power over all construction projects on the Nile and its tributaries.

These rights came to be known as Egypt’s and Sudan’s acquired rights. They have been the main sticking point in efforts to conclude a treaty between all 11 Nile riparian states for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, as well as between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Ethiopian dam.

While Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states see these two treaties as colonial anachronisms that have no relevance to modern Nile governance, Egypt and Sudan insist that they are binding.

What impact would a breakthrough have on other Nile Basin agreements?

The impact will depend on what type of agreement is reached. Assume that both Egypt and Sudan agree to abandon the rights granted by the 1929 and 1959 treaties. They could then enter into negotiation with Ethiopia to produce a new treaty that creates rights for all three states.

Such a treaty could provide the impetus for all 11 Nile Basin states to return to the Cooperative Framework Agreement, which was expected to provide a legal framework for governing the Nile based on equitable and reasonable water use. The framework agreement has been in limbo since Egypt and Sudan rejected it.

The other Nile Basin states see these colonial-era treaties as a violation of international law principles, and a breach of the vision of the Nile Basin Initiative.

What other claims threaten the status quo?

Egypt fears that if Addis Ababa is allowed to fill the reservoir without a legally binding agreement, other Nile Basin states might also take unilateral actions. This could harm Egypt’s water security and ability to control projects on the Nile River and its tributaries.

Then, there is the matter of how to manage issues related to climate change, such as droughts and floods. The existence of the dam means Addis Ababa’s cooperation will be required. In times of drought, for example, the Ethiopian dam will be expected to release some water to help Egypt and Sudan.

Ethiopia’s right to water for agriculture and household consumption is an issue that has not yet been agreed upon by all three countries.

Egypt and Sudan are worried about the harm that could come to them from activities upstream. Egypt remains adamant that the dam will hurt its water supply and threaten domestic development.

But Sudanese officials appear to have changed their assessment of the impact of the dam. They now see it as a potential regulator of seasonal floods and provider of clean energy.

These issues should be examined thoroughly during the negotiations. The three countries should adopt a treaty or agreement that is mutually acceptable and beneficial.

Over the years, the three countries have struggled to bring meaning to terms like “significant harm” and “equitable and reasonable utilisation”. The final treaty should define these terms. It should also create a mediation mechanism, which can include referring certain specified matters to the International Court of Justice for resolution.

John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.